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“No More No-Poach”:  An Antitrust 
Plaintiff’s Guide  
Amanda Triplett* 
Abstract 
It may seem that agreements between employers not to hire or 
solicit employees from each other would be illegal under the 
Sherman Act’s prohibition of conspiracies to fix prices or allocate 
markets. However, the complexity of this issue pushes the 
boundaries of antitrust law. But the core principals of antitrust law 
are tailored to reject them. In a market of employers, where firms 
are competitors, no-poach restraints have horizontal elements 
subject to a harsher standard of antitrust review. Firms that enter 
into these arrangements bypass legal methods to protect against the 
harms of employee loss, such as a non-compete agreement. Just as 
in a classic cartel, these firms are motivated by a desire to fix wages, 
and worse, weaken transparent wage information in the labor 
market. Possible vertical elements of these restraints, such as in 
franchise systems, should not alter this analysis—despite potential 
Copperweld or unilateralism defenses. 
There is a strong case in antitrust jurisprudence for per se or 
quick-look condemnation, including through the use of the hub-
and-spoke conspiracy doctrine. In the case of specialized employees, 
in particular, extended rule of reason condemnation is possible. 
Once an antitrust plaintiff meets the initial burden, it will be 
unlikely that a defendant can raise a pro-competitive justification 
defense. Only in limited circumstances are no-poach agreements 
truly ancillary to integrations between firms, necessary for the 
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I.  An Introduction to No-Poach Agreements 
A.  From Apple to McDonald’s 
In the early 2000s, several Silicon Valley tech companies 
(including Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Lucasfilm, and 
Pixar) entered into an interconnected web of agreements 
prohibiting the parties from cold calling or soliciting each other’s 
employees.1 Each agreement included the “active involvement and 
participation of a company under the control of the late Steven P. 
Jobs . . . and/or a company whose board shared at least one 
member of Apple’s board of directors.”2 It is likely that the 
agreements were negotiated CEO to CEO.3 Subsequent details 
                                                                                                     
 1. See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[E]ach company placed the names of the other company’s 
employees on a ‘Do Not Cold Call’ list and instructed recruiters not to cold call the 
employees of the other company.”). 
 2. See id. (describing the role of Apple and Steven Jobs in orchestrating the 
web of agreements). 
 3. See id. at 1117 (“Based on Mr. Jobs’s attempt to negotiate a ‘Do Not Cold 
Call’ agreement directly with Palm’s CEO, it is reasonable to infer that such 
agreements were negotiated directly CEO to CEO.”). 
384 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 381 (2019) 
were then negotiated, executed, monitored, and concealed by 
senior executives at each participating company.4  
The employees never agreed to this arrangement by signing 
non-compete agreements.5 Yet, this was the effect of the 
conspiracy; the agreement fractured competition in the tech labor 
market, depressing the “total compensation and mobility of all 
Defendants’ employees.”6 The lone defector in this agreement, 
Palm, Inc., stated that the “proposal that . . . neither company will 
hire the other’s employees, regardless of the individual’s desires, is 
not only wrong, it is likely illegal.”7 There is some evidence that his 
assumption was correct. The Department of Justice (DOJ) argued 
that this conspiracy was per se illegal and the parties responded 
by entering consent decrees.8 However, because consent decrees 
were entered, the court never explicitly held that these agreements 
were per se illegal.9  
Consider also the plight of Leinani Deslandes.10 She began as 
an entry-level employee at a McDonald’s franchise, was promoted 
to shift-manager, then department manager, and began 
coursework to become a general manager.11 She stated that her 
course was cancelled when her supervisors learned she was 
pregnant.12 Although Deslandes sought a comparable position at a 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 1110 (describing the role of senior executives in enforcing the 
no-poach agreements). 
 5. See id. (“Defendants’ employees were not informed of, nor did they agree 
to, the terms of any of the agreements.”). 
 6. See id. at 1111 (explaining the importance of cold-calling and 
non-solicitation on this labor market). 
 7. See id. at 1112 (describing Palm’s rejection of Apple’s no-poach proffer). 
 8. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 
United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 75 Fed. Reg. 60820, 60820-01 (Oct. 1, 2010) 
(describing the consent decree’s terms).  
 9. See Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 75 
Fed. Reg. 60820 (Oct. 1, 2010) (“[T]his Final Judgment does not constitute any 
admission by the Defendants that the law has been violated . . . .”). 
 10. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 
3105955, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“After a no-hire agreement prevented 
plaintiff from obtaining a position with a rival employer, plaintiff . . .  filed suit 
asserting, among other things, that defendants' no-hire agreement violates the 
Sherman Antitrust Act . . . .”). 
 11. See id. at *3 (describing Deslandes’s time as an employee with 
McDonald’s). 
 12. See id. (describing the facts of the case). 
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nearby McDonald’s franchise restaurant, she was told that the 
restaurant could not interview her unless she was “released” by 
her previous franchise employer.13 This policy originated from 
standard provisions within every McDonald’s franchise contract 
prohibiting franchise restaurants from poaching employees from 
each other.14 However, Deslandes was not released because she 
was “too valuable” and she ultimately had to take an entry-level 
job with lower pay.15 Unfortunately, Leinani Deslandes’s legal 
claim is highly uncertain.16 Given the unique orientation between 
franchisor and franchisee in these cases, the courts have struggled 
to identify the applicable antitrust standard.17 
For the remainder of Part I, this Note will provide an overview 
of the antitrust framework as a solution in addition to the history 
and development of the current no-poach landscape.18 In Part II, 
this Note will outline the steps to proving the first element, the 
agreement requirement, of a § 1 claim.19 This will include potential 
complications in vertical agreements such as the unilateral action 
doctrine, the hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and the intra-enterprise 
doctrine.20 In Part III, this Note will then discuss the second 
element of a § 1 claim—proving that the restraint at issue is 
unreasonable.21 Specifically, this Note will outline the three 
standards of review, concluding that per se condemnation is most 
                                                                                                     
 13. See id. (demonstrating the effect of the no-poach agreement on the 
employee). 
 14. See id. at *6 (outlining the contractual no-poach agreement provision in 
detail). 
 15. See id. at *9 (stating that Deslandes “had to start over at the bottom 
elsewhere” because of the no-poach agreement). 
 16. See infra Parts I.C–E and accompanying text (describing the agencies’ 
and federal courts’ experience with no-poach restraints). 
 17. See infra Part I.E (illustrating the unique difficulties of franchise no-
poach restraints). 
 18. See infra Parts I.C–E and accompanying text (outlining the current state 
of no-poach antitrust jurisprudence). 
 19. See infra Part II and accompanying text (discussing the Sherman Act’s 
conspiracy element). 
 20. See infra Parts II.B–D and accompanying text (describing various 
antitrust defenses and complications that arise with vertical restraints). 
 21. See infra Part III and accompanying text (explaining the second element 
of a § 1 violation). 
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appropriate while there is a strong argument for quick-look review 
in the alternative.22 In Part IV, this Note will discuss the ways an 
antitrust plaintiff, after making out a claim, should defend against 
a defendant’s pro-competitive justifications.23 Should the plaintiff 
meet its initial burden, it is likely that the defendant will not be 
able to successfully raise a justification.24 
B.  Antitrust Law as a Solution:  An Overview of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act 
Antitrust law is not intended to protect social interests beyond 
the maintenance of a competitive marketplace.25 However, its 
reach is broad enough to protect employees’ rights.26 Antitrust law 
was designed to ensure the proper functioning of the markets, 
including the labor market.27 
Antitrust law addresses employer conspiracies controlling 
employment terms precisely because they tamper with the 
employment market and thereby impair the opportunities of 
those who sell their services there. Just as antitrust law seeks 
to preserve the free market opportunities of buyers and sellers 
of goods, so also it seeks to do the same for buyers and sellers of 
employment services.28 
                                                                                                     
 22. See infra Part III and accompanying text (outlining the per se, quick-
look, and rule of reason antitrust standards). 
 23. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (illustrating the requirements 
for a successful pro-competitive defense in no-poach cases). 
 24. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (illustrating the rigorous 
requirements for a successful pro-competitive defense in no-poach cases). 
 25. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) 
(rejecting the argument that a competitive restraint can be justified by the social 
dangers of promoting inferior engineering services). 
 26. See ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 1 (2016) [hereinafter HR 
GUIDANCE] (describing the importance of an unconstrained labor market for 
employees). 
 27. See id. at 2 (“Just as competition among sellers in an open marketplace 
[benefits] consumers . . . competition among employers helps actual and potential 
employees through higher wages, better benefits, or other terms of 
employment.”). 
 28. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶352c (4th ed. 2018 
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Because no-poach agreements occur in the labor market, 
however, they differ from typical restraints of trade between 
sellers (firms which sell, distribute, or produce goods or services 
for consumers).29 Instead, no-poach agreements impact buyers 
(firms which purchase labor from employee sellers).30 However, the 
DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have an extended 
history challenging buy-side restraints on the labor market.31  The 
theory is that competition in the labor market provides actual and 
potential employees with higher wages, better benefits, and more 
varied types of employment—all of which ultimately benefit 
consumers because “a more competitive workforce may create 
more or better goods and services.”32 
In the case of no-poach agreements, the most likely avenue for 
antitrust relief would be § 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act outlaws every “contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . .”33 The law does not reach unilateral acts of 
monopolization by individual firms, which are governed by other 
antitrust laws such as § 2 of the Sherman Act.34 This distinction, 
in fact, can constitute a defense.35 The intra-enterprise doctrine, or 
                                                                                                     
Cum. Supp. 2010-2017) (describing the antitrust law’s application to the labor 
market). 
 29. See id. ¶352a (“Employees may challenge antitrust violations that are 
premised on restraining the employment market . . . Standing for employees thus 
parallels that for ‘suppliers’ generally[.]”) 
   30. See id. (describing the employment market as a supply side market). 
 31. See generally Council of Fashion Designers of Am., 120 F.T.C. 817, 819 
(1995) (bringing an FTC enforcement action against a trade association for 
agreeing to suppress the wages of fashion models);  In re Debes Corp., 115 F.T.C. 
701, 704 (1992) (initiating an FTC enforcement action against nursing homes for 
boycotting a nurse registry requesting increased wages);  Complaint at ¶ 19, 
United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Human Res. Admin., No. 94C282G, 
1994 WL 16460700  (D. Utah Mar. 14, 1994) (alleging an agreement between 
hospitals to share employment and budget information in order to suppress nurse 
wages). 
 32. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (describing the pro-competitive 
effects of an unconstrained labor market). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 34. See id. § 2 (targeting unilateral conduct rather than conspiracies to 
restrain trade). 
 35. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text (describing the Copperweld 
defense). 
388 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 381 (2019) 
Copperweld doctrine, recognizes the circumstance that two firms 
may operate so closely that their decisions are essentially 
unilateral, rendering them incapable of conspiring under § 1.36  
The first element in a § 1 analysis is a horizontal, vertical, or 
“hub and spoke” conspiracy between two or more parties.37 A 
horizontal conspiracy is an agreement between competing firms, 
while a vertical conspiracy is an agreement between firms 
operating at different levels of the supply chain—such as a 
manufacturer and retailer.38 A hub-and-spoke conspiracy 
combines these elements;  it is found where a “hub” orchestrates a 
series of vertical agreements, with distributors for example 
(“spokes”), in order to facilitate a larger horizontal conspiracy 
among the competing distributors (“the rim”).39 
The second element of a § 1 violation is a “restraint of trade.”40 
However, the Sherman Act has never been read literally;  it 
condemns only unreasonable restraints of trade.41 The primary 
mode for determining the “reasonableness” of a restraint is the rule 
of reason;  in this analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
restraint is anticompetitive.42 However, the courts have also 
fashioned per se rules for certain offenses (usually horizontal 
restraints) that are universally understood to be anticompetitive.43 
If a plaintiff demonstrates a per se violation, there is no need to 
                                                                                                     
 36. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text (describing the Copperweld 
defense). 
 37. See § 1 (outlawing every “contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy . . . .”). 
 38. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing 
horizontal and vertical agreements). 
 39. See id. at 934–36 (finding the existence of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy 
where vertical agreements facilitated a per se unlawful, horizontal agreement 
among Toys “R” Us’ distributors). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (noting the statutory language of the Sherman 
Act). 
 41. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (discussing a 
divergence between the literal text of the Sherman Act and its treatment by 
federal courts). 
 42. See id. (describing the administration of the rule of reason). 
 43. See id. (“Per se liability is reserved only for those agreements that ‘are 
so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to 
establish their illegality.’” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978))). 
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show anticompetitive effects.44 Pro-competitive effects can only 
then be asserted as a justification in certain limited instances.45 As 
a result, per se or rule of reason treatment can have a dramatic 
effect on the plaintiff’s burden-and the outcome of a case. 
There is also a third, intermediate standard which falls in the 
middle of the spectrum between the rule of reason and per se 
standard.46 A rule of reason analysis may be truncated upon a 
“quick look” in circumstances in which a layperson with a 
rudimentary understanding of economics would recognize the 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint.47 The practical effect of  
this analysis—which will be important if the per se rule is not 
applied to no-poach agreements—is that the plaintiff is not 
required to put forth detailed evidence of anticompetitive effects 
through a demonstration of market power.48 
If a plaintiff can meet his or her burden under one of the three 
modes of analysis, the burden shifts to the defendant.49 Under all 
of these modes, including the per se rule, the defendant can still 
argue that these restraints are not “naked” anticompetitive 
restraints but are “ancillary” to pro-competitive activities.50 If the 
defendant successfully makes a justification argument, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that these efficiencies could 
have been achieved by less restrictive means.51 The plaintiff can 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) 
(“Certain categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per se illegal, 
dispensing with the need for case-by-case evaluation.”). 
 45. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (describing the ancillary 
restraint doctrine’s requirements in asserting a pro-competitive efficiencies). 
 46. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (describing “what 
has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis under the rule of reason 
. . .”). 
 47. See id. (describing when a quick-look analysis would be appropriate). 
 48. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (stating that as a 
matter of law, the “absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked 
restriction on price or output” under a quick look analysis).  
 49. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“If the plaintiff 
carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a 
procompetitive rational for the restraint.”). 
 50. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 
1985) (discerning naked and ancillary restraints). 
 51. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (outlining the rule of reason burden-
shifting test). 
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also rebut the defendant’s justification argument by showing that 
the harms outweigh potential efficiencies.52 Additionally, the 
justifications a defendant can put forward are limited;  they must 
promote an integrative venture, serve a pro-competitive purpose, 
and be commensurate or necessary to achieve the intended 
efficiencies.53 
C.  The DOJ and FTC’s Application of Antitrust Principles to 
No-Poach Agreements 
1.  The Agencies Publicize Their Intent to Criminalize No-Poach 
Agreements, Stating That They Constitute Per Se Unlawful 
Market Allocations 
In October 2016, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the 
FTC issued “Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource 
Professionals” to call attention to no-poach agreements.54 The 
agencies announced their intent to proceed criminally against 
these agreements because “[they] eliminate competition in the 
same irredeemable way as agreements to fix product prices or 
allocate customers, which have traditionally been criminally 
investigated and prosecuted as hardcore cartel conduct.”55 
Specifically, the agencies view this conduct as “a type of allocation 
agreement affecting a labor market” where employers allocate the 
market of employees between themselves.56 Market allocation 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 2291 (“[If the defendant successfully bears this burden, the 
antitrust plaintiff may still carry the day by showing . . . that the legitimate 
objective does not outweigh the harm that competition will suffer, i.e., that the 
agreement “on balance” remains unreasonable.”). 
 53. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (describing the limitations in 
asserting pro-competitive efficiencies). 
 54. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4 (“Agreements among employers 
not to recruit certain employees or not to compete on terms of compensation are 
illegal.”).  
 55. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4 (describing the comparable 
anticompetitive harms created by no-poach agreements and market allocation 
agreements). 
 56. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. 
No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) 
[hereinafter Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp.] (describing the United States’ 
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restraints have been held, time and time again, by the Supreme 
Court, to be per se unlawful.57 As a result, the agencies  correctly 
view no-poach agreements as per se unlawful market allocation 
agreements unless they are necessary in facilitating a 
pro-competitive venture.58 
The practical effect when companies “agree not to hire or 
recruit one another’s employees [is that] they are agreeing not to 
compete for those employees’ labor.”59 Yet, employees’ negotiating 
power often depends on the existence of competing offers of 
employment.60 A successful no-poach agreement restricts this 
competitive information;  in turn, employees cannot measure the 
value of their services in the market against competing offers or 
employers in order to seek better terms of employment.61 All 
conspiring employers then benefit from the depressed price of 
labor.62 The employees are left in the cold and the dark, despite the 
fact that they never agreed to a non-compete covenant agreement 
                                                                                                     
position on whether the per se rule should be applied to no-poach agreements).  
 57. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) 
(discussing several Supreme Court decisions which found market allocation 
restraints illegal).  
 58. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 1–2 
(explaining the Department of Justice’s position on the legality of no-poach 
agreements).  
 59. See No-Poach Approach:  Division Update Spring 2019, ANTITRUST DIV., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-
update-spring-2019/no-poach-approach (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2019) (discussing the Department of Justice’s recent actions against 
employers who participate in no-poach agreements) [https://perma.cc/925D-
DFJ3].  
 60. See id. (“Robbing employees of labor market competition deprives them 
of job opportunities, information, and the ability to use competing offers to 
negotiate better terms of employment.”).  
 61. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 8 (“As with 
other types of allocation agreements, an employee that is victim of an allocation 
agreement . . . among employers cannot reap the benefits of competition among 
those employers that may result in higher wages or better terms of 
employment.”).  
 62. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 8 
(explaining that no-poach agreements “enable employers to avoid competing over 
wages and other terms of employment offered to the affected employees.”).  
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with their employer (which would at least be more limited in its 
duration and scope).63 
Further, the agencies recognized the horizontal nature of 
these agreements, stating that the effect of these restraints on the 
labor market is the same “regardless of whether the [conspiring] 
firms make the same products or . . . services.”64 In other words, 
firms may be horizontally aligned (as competitors for certain 
employees) in the labor market regardless of whether they are 
competitors in their downstream markets for goods and services.65 
2.  The Agencies Have Been Successful Applying This Theory in 
Enforcement Actions 
All of the agencies’ enforcement actions to date have dealt with 
purely horizontal agreements.66 In other words, the defendants 
were firms who not only competed for the same employees but who 
also competed in the same downstream sellers’ market for goods 
and services.67 For example, the agencies’ experience with 
no-poach agreements originated from the three DOJ enforcement 
actions against Silicon Valley technology companies discussed 
above.68 Additionally, the Antitrust Division has more recently 
                                                                                                     
 63. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text (noting that a justified 
restraint must be limited in its scope and duration). 
 64. Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 7. 
 65. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 7 (focusing 
on labor as the relevant market for a no-poach analysis, as opposed to downstream 
effects on consumers). 
 66. See infra Part I.C and accompanying text (describing the federal 
government’s experience with no-poach enforcement actions).  
 67. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 2–3, United States v. 
Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter 
Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement] (discussing an agreement between 
manufacturers of railway equipment);  Complaint at *1–2, United States v. eBay, 
Inc., No. 5:1212-cv-05869-PSGPSG, 2012 WL 5727488 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter eBay Complaint] (alleging no-poach agreement between tech firms);  
Complaint at *1, United States v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-02220, 2010 WL 
5344347 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Lucasfilm Complaint] (classifying the 
defendants as “digital animation studios”);  Complaint at *1, United States v. 
Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629-RBW, 2010 WL 11417874 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 
2010) [hereinafter Adobe Complaint] (identifying defendants as high-tech firms).  
 68. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (describing the government’s 
early initial experience with a no-poach claim). 
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reiterated its position in a case involving rail component 
competitors Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake 
Technologies Corp. (Wabtec).69 Notably, the  parties consented to a 
judgment that enjoined the defendants from engaging in further 
no-poach agreements and required them to submit any evidence of 
additional no-poach agreements with other companies.70 
The FTC also recently brought an FTC Act, Section 5 claim 
against competing home-care staffing agencies in the matter of 
Your Therapy Source and entered a consent decree in July 2018.71 
In this case, the agreement was not technically a no-poach 
agreement but a wage-fixing agreement;  respondents exchanged 
“pay rate information with each other and jointly agreed to lower 
therapist pay rates to the same level.”72 The effect was the same, 
however; the defendants agreed not to compete in the labor market 
“in an attempt to prevent therapists from switching to competing 
staffing companies paying higher rates.”73 
To date, the agencies have not prosecuted a no-poach claim 
with vertical elements.74 A vertical element would present trickier 
questions of law.75 First, it would test the agencies’ position that 
agreements between vertically oriented firms nonetheless 
constitute horizontal agreements between competitors in the labor 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 67, at *88 
(reiterating the view that no-poach agreements are per se unlawful horizontal 
labor market allocation agreements—unless they are reasonably necessary to a 
separate, legitimate collaboration or transaction). 
 70. See Final Judgment at *1–2, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 
1:18-cv-00747, 2018 WL 4386565 CKK (D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (describing the 
agreed-upon terms between the parties). 
 71. See Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment at *2, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC, No. 171-0134, 2018 WL 3769237 
(F.T.C. July 31, 2018) (explaining the terms of the consent agreement).  
 72. See id. at *1 (stating that the alleged behavior violated Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, depriving therapists of the benefits of competition by coordinating 
wages). 
 73. See Complaint at 3, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC, No. 171-0134, 2018 
WL 3769237 (F.T.C. July 31, 2018) (alleging the nature of the Respondents’ 
conduct). 
 74. See infra Part I.C and accompanying text (describing the government’s 
experience with no-poach restraints). 
 75. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.   
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market.76 And because the more permissive rule of reason typically 
applies to vertical agreements, this distinction is important.77 
Additionally, the reason that vertical relationships are treated 
differently in the law is because of their potential for 
pro-competitive efficiencies.78 As a result, no-poach agreements 
with vertical elements are more likely to present potential 
justification arguments.79 Despite the agencies’ inaction in the 
franchise context, however, private no-poach claims against 
franchises have raised these questions.80 In doing so, they raised 
the public’s attention and invoked a response from the Front Office 
of the Department of Justice.81 
D.  Federal Courts Grapple with Private No-Poach Franchise 
Claims 
Attorneys General of ten states and the District of Columbia 
announced in 2018 that they were investigating contractual 
no-hire provisions in fast-food franchise agreements.82 Shortly 
thereafter, seven fast-food chains agreed to remove these 
provisions from their franchise agreements or not to enforce 
them.83 However, a number of franchise employees have filed class 
action complaints against franchisors and franchisees.84 
                                                                                                     
 76. See infra Part I.C.1 and accompanying text (laying out the government’s 
theory concerning no-poach restraints). 
 77. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 
(2007) (noting that the antitrust laws treat vertical and horizontal agreements 
differently). 
 78. See id. at 894 (arguing against the use of a per se analysis for vertical 
restraints because they often create market efficiencies).  
 79. See id. (describing the potential efficiencies of vertical restraints). 
 80. See infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text (describing private no-
poach claims). 
 81. See infra Part I.E (noting the government’s response to the issues raised 
in recent private no-poach claims). 
 82. See Anthony Noto, New York AG Joins Coalition to go After Fast-Food 
Franchisors, NEW YORK BUS. J. (July 9, 2018, 1:17 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/07/09/new-york-ag-joins-
coalition-to-go-after-fast-food.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (listing the chains 
that have no-poach provisions in their franchise contracts) 
[https://perma.cc/N8PG-LKMH].  
 83. See id. (noting the effect of the Attorneys Generals’ announcements). 
 84. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, 
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Additionally, Senators Cory Booker and Elizabeth Warren 
introduced the End Employer Collusion Act, a bill that includes 
prohibitions on no-poach agreements, particularly those between 
franchisors and franchisees.85 Senators Booker and Warren also 
sent a letter to then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, asking for 
additional guidance on the treatment of franchise no-poach 
agreements.86 
Although Sessions did not respond, three district court judges 
have denied defendants’ motions to dismiss in franchise no-poach 
cases against Jimmy John’s, McDonalds, and Cinnabon.87 Each 
court recognized that no-poach provisions in franchise contracts 
are vertical agreements that may have horizontal elements as 
well.88 Two of these courts remained open to applying the per se 
standard of review if the plaintiff could show a horizontal 
relationship among franchisees.89 Additionally, two courts 
                                                                                                     
LLC, No. 1:17-cv-04857, 2017 WL 2804891 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2017) (alleging that 
“franchisees agreed not to recruit or hire each other's employees or employees of 
McDonald's or its affiliates”);  Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, 
No. 4:17-cv-00788, 2017 WL 5078431 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017) (alleging a 
no-solicitation and no-hire agreement among the defendants);  Class Action 
Complaint ¶ 1, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133 , 2018 
WL 565099565099 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018) (alleging that franchisees “agreed not 
to solicit, recruit, or hire each other's employees”).  
 85. See End Employer Collusion Act, S. 2215, 116th Cong. (2019) (asking 
that employers amend their franchise agreements by removing restrictive 
employment provisions). 
 86. See Letter from Cory A. Booker & Elizabeth Warren, Members, U.S. 
Senate, to Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Nov. 21, 2017) (“Despite this clear guidance, no-poach agreements continue to 
proliferate in franchise agreements, even though many franchise companies claim 
that they are not joint employers regarding their franchisees.”).  
 87. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, 2018 No. 18 5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, 
at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018);  Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 
F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2018);  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 
No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018). 
 88. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4 (discussing vertical and horizontal 
elements in the agreements not to solicit or hire Cinnabon employees);  Butler, 
331 F. Supp. 3d at 795 (recognizing vertical elements but stating that the “effects 
are felt strictly at the horizontal level”);  Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 6 
(stating that “the agreement was spearheaded by an entity at the top of the 
chain”). 
 89. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 792–93 (stating that the plaintiff must 
first distinguish whether the restraint constitutes a vertical or horizontal 
restraint subject to per se condemnation);  Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 5–
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contemplated the intra-enterprise doctrine,90 with one noting that 
this conclusion would depend on the evidence uncovered during 
discovery.91 One court also recognized the potential for a per se 
violation to be shown via a hub-and-spoke conspiracy.92 
Additionally, all of the courts recognized the potential applicability 
of the abbreviated rule of reason or “quick-look” standard (an 
intermediate level of review between per se and extended rule of 
reason review).93 Finally, while the courts recognized potential 
ancillary justifications,94 one court in particular expressed doubt 
that these would be viable.95  
                                                                                                     
6 (noting that per se treatment may apply in the absence of an ancillary 
pro-competitive justification). 
 90. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *33 (“[A]greements made within a firm can 
constitute concerted action covered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act 
on interests separate from those of the firm itself—here competing for labor with 
Cinnabon and the other franchisees.”);  Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797 (noting that 
the plaintiff plausibly stated a claim but that the analysis may depend on how 
independent the franchisees were in relation to the franchisor with respect to the 
intra-enterprise doctrine). 
 91. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797 (“[If] the evidence of franchisee 
independence is weak, or if Jimmy John’s carries its burden under the quick look 
approach, then the rule of reason may rear its head and burn this case to the 
ground.”). 
 92. See id. at 795 (noting that the claimant plausibly stated a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy where “the ‘hub’ firm enters into a collection of vertical agreements 
with other firms—the ‘spokes’—and those spokes then enter into a collection of 
horizontal agreements that make up the ‘wheel’”). 
 93. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (noting that the plaintiff plausibly alleged 
anticompetitive effects under the quick look standard but that the defendant 
raised plausible pro-competitive arguments, invalidating a per se standard of 
review);  Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. 
Ill. July 31, 2018) (failing to reach a conclusion about the standard of review but 
remaining open to per se, quick look, and rule of reason analysis while noting that 
quick look was most likely to apply);  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 
C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (recognizing the 
possibility that the restraint was potentially ancillary to a pro-competitive 
collaboration between franchisor and franchisee, subjecting to “some form” of rule 
of reason analysis such as quick look analysis). 
 94. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at*4 (stating that “it is not clear that the 
Defendants' agreements lack any redeeming virtue”);  Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 
797 (recognizing that the agreements may have procompetitive intrabrand 
benefits);  Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7 (“Each time McDonald’s entered a 
franchise agreement, it increased output of burgers and fries, which is to say the 
agreement was output enhancing and thus procompetitive.”).  
 95. See Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–9 (“In this case, plaintiff has 
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In Ms. Deslandes’s claim against McDonald’s, Judge Alonso 
explained the potential issues facing a franchise defendant who 
raises a pro-competitive justification that the provision promotes 
interbrand competition (between separate restaurant chains).96 He 
stated that “the very fact that McDonald’s has managed to 
continue signing franchise agreements even after it stopped 
including the provision in 2017 suggests that the no-hire provision 
was not necessary to encourage franchisees to sign.”97 Importantly, 
he noted that McDonald’s justification argument is grounded in  
the conclusion that the relevant antitrust market is the market for 
hamburgers rather than employees.98 He disagreed with this 
theory, stating that  “[t]his case . . . is not about competition for the 
sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for 
employees, and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s 
franchisees and McOpCos within a locale are direct, horizontal, 
competitors.”99 He concludes that: 
A way to promote intrabrand competition for employees would 
be an advertising campaign extolling the virtues of working for 
McDonald’s. That is not what defendants are alleged to have 
done here. Here, they are alleged to have divided the market for 
employees by prohibiting restaurants from hiring each other’s 
current or former (for the prior six months, anyway) employees. 
In the employment market, the various McDonald’s stores are 
competing brands. Dividing the market does not promote 
intrabrand competition for employees, it stifles interbrand 
                                                                                                     
alleged a horizontal restraint that is ancillary to franchise agreements for 
McDonald’s restaurants . . .That is not to say that the provision itself was output 
enhancing.”).  
 96. See Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–8 (describing the issues with 
asserting a procompetitive justification). 
 97. Id. at *7. 
 98. See id. at *8 
It makes sense for McDonald’s franchisees and the McOpCos to 
cooperate to promote intrabrand competition for hamburgers, because 
a customer who is satisfied with a hamburger she buys today at the 
McDonald’s at 111 W. Jackson might tomorrow prefer a hamburger 
from the McDonald’s at 233 W. Jackson to a hamburger from Burger 
King. 
 99. See id. (clarifying the relevant antitrust market as the labor market). 
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competition.100 
E.  DOJ Officials Respond, Expressing Reluctance to Apply the 
Theory to Vertical Entities 
Beginning in 2019, the Department of Justice began to make 
the unusual move of issuing statements of interest in private 
lawsuits.101 Also unusual was the fact that these statements were 
signed by President Trump’s appointed Assistant Attorney, 
General Makan Delrahim, and other Front Office officials.102 
Several of these statements of interest simply restate the agency’s 
position that no-poach agreements are per se illegal in the absence 
of a pro-competitive collaboration.103 These were written in 
response to cases in which the parties are competitors.104 
For example, one of the DOJ’s recently filed statements of 
interest was in Seaman v. Duke University,105 a private action 
alleging that Duke University and the University of North 
Carolina agreed not to solicit each other’s medical school faculty.106 
In this statement, the DOJ reiterated its opinion that no-poach 
agreements are simply a variant of a per se illegal market 
allocation and should be condemned under existing law.107 
Further, it stated that Duke’s arguments that the restraints were 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. 
 101. See Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States at i, Harris v. 
CJ Star, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-00247-SAB (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter 
Harris] (providing an example of a DOJ statement of interest in a private 
lawsuit);  Statement of Interest of the United States at i, Seaman v. Duke Univ., 
No. 1:15-cv-462 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Seaman] (same).  
 102. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 101 at 18 (naming the Assistant Attorney 
General, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Chief of Staff and General 
Counsel, in addition to attorneys from the Antitrust Division).  
 103. See Harris, supra note 101, at 10 (comparing the effects of no-poach and 
wage-fixing agreements). 
 104. See, e.g., infra notes 105–110 and accompanying text (describing a no-
poach agreement between competing universities). 
 105. Seaman, supra 101.  
 106. See Seaman, supra 101, at 3 (discussing the facts of the underlying 
litigation).  
 107. See Seaman, supra 101, at 5 (stating that the no-poach agreement is a 
form of agreed market-allocation). 
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ancillary to a pro-competitive justification should be rejected.108 
The defendants’ justifications were not related to any legitimate 
integration between the universities and, as a result, they could 
not argue that the conduct was necessary to promote this 
venture.109 Notably, within this statement, the DOJ referred to the 
fact that its position in this case with horizontal competitors would 
differ in the franchise context.110 
Rather than filing its own litigation, the DOJ filed statements 
of interest in class action lawsuits against Carl’s Jr., Auntie 
Anne’s, and Arby’s—clarifying that no-poach agreements between 
a franchisor and franchisee typically merit rule of reason analysis, 
that quick-look analysis should not apply, and that the franchise 
model does not necessarily constitute a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy.”111 The timing of these statements of interests 
indicates that they are a response to the district courts’ conclusions 
in private no-poach actions.112 The statements could indicate a 
reluctance to create law that could constrain vertical agreements, 
which more conservative antitrust theorists have traditionally 
presumed to be output-enhancing.113 In addition to examining the 
antitrust analysis for no-poach agreements through a wider lens, 
this Note will weigh these conclusions in the franchise context. 
                                                                                                     
 108. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 28–29 (“Duke also wrongly argues that 
the rule of reason must apply because ‘the schools collaborate and support each 
other’ and a no-poach agreement could help prevent ‘free riding’ on their 
investment in medical faculty.”).  
 109. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 29 (stating that Duke did not identify 
any specific procompetitive collaborations with its competitor).  
 110. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 26–27 (“Moreover, both Yi and Deslandes 
involve no-poach provisions in franchise agreements, which are quite different 
from the naked no-poach agreement between competitors alleged here.”). 
 111. See generally Harris, supra note 101;  Statement of Interest of the United 
States, Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00246 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 
2019) [hereinafter Richmond]; Corrected Statement of Interest of the United 
States, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 
2019) [hereinafter Stigar]. 
 112. Compare supra Part I.C, with supra note 111 and accompanying text 
(detailing the existing private franchise no-poach cases and accompanying 
statements of interests).   
 113. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 291 (1978) (“We have seen 
that vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance), vertical market division 
(closed dealer territories), and, indeed, all vertical restraints are beneficial to 
consumers and should for that reason be completely lawful.”).  
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II.  Element 1:  Proving an Agreement 
A.  Agreements Are Shown by Evidence of Express Agreement or 
by “Plus Factors” 
In the cases brought by the Antitrust Division, the agreements 
were evidenced by email communications describing hiring 
policies, internal approvals of employees to be hired from 
conspiring firms, direct and explicit communications to enforce the 
no-poach agreement, evidence of senior executives negotiating the 
agreements, and in some cases, written contracts.114 Although the 
high-tech antitrust actions brought by the Antitrust Division were 
settled, a court adjudicating a follow-on class action assessed the 
sufficiency of the evidence of a conspiracy in this case.115 The 
district court in the Ninth Circuit found that there was ample 
evidence to support the existence of an agreement;  direct 
communications in addition to circumstantial evidence including 
substantially identical agreements between the tech companies 
and company-wide enforcement of the contracts by senior 
executives.116 Tellingly, after this proceeding, the companies also 
reached a settlement.117 
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is in line with existing antitrust 
principles.118 First, a court examining a no-poach agreement would 
                                                                                                     
 114. See Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 67, at 2–3 
(describing email communications between the defendants’ senior executives);  In 
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“Apple and Adobe reached the agreement through direct and explicit 
communications between their senior executives, who actively managed and 
enforced the agreement through further direct communications.”);  eBay 
Complaint, supra note 67, at 5 (alleging in-person meetings between senior 
managers of the defendant firms);  Adobe Complaint, supra note 67 (alleging 
“direct and explicit communications” between senior executives of the named 
defendants);  Lucasfilm Complaint, supra note 67, at 4 (alleging that Pixar 
executives drafted written terms and supplied them to Lucasfilm). 
 115. See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115–
23 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (assessing the plausibility of a conspiracy in light of the 
evidence). 
 116. See id. at 1116–18 (weighing the plausibility of an unlawful agreement 
on the basis of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations). 
 117. See Settlement Agreement, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 
5:11CV02509, 2013 WL 8480300 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2013) (resolving the dispute). 
 118. See infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (describing the antitrust 
analysis for the conspiracy element of a § 1 claim). 
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consider direct evidence including documents, meetings, and 
testimony that “defendants exchanged commitments or 
collaborated by some means other than making a market place 
decision.”119 Circumstantial evidence is also considered, especially 
where direct evidence is insufficient.120 If evidence of an express 
agreement does not exist, the court will also consider whether the 
parallel behavior (i.e. no-poaching conduct) is likely to be caused 
by an agreement rather than natural market forces.121 If 
interdependence between the firms seems likely, the court must 
weigh all of the evidence to decide whether the possibility of 
conspiracy is more probable than not.122 
1.  Proving a Conspiracy by Evidence of an Express Agreement 
Although direct evidence of an express agreement is often 
decisive, it is not commonly found.123 However, in the actions 
brought by the Antitrust Division, direct and circumstantial 
evidence of an express agreement were available;  the reason for 
this may be that some form of communication is often necessary in 
a very practical sense in order to effectuate and enforce 
no-poaching agreements.124 Nonetheless, in the case that 
                                                                                                     
 119. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing the question of whether the behavior was concerted or had another 
plausible explanation based on competitive market conditions).  
 120. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003) 
(explaining the process a court should follow when weighing evidence of a 
conspiracy in antitrust litigation). 
 121. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing the question of whether the behavior was concerted or has another 
plausible explanation based on competitive market conditions). 
 122. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003) 
(explaining the steps a court should take in weighing evidence of conspiracy in 
antitrust litigation). 
 123. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003) 
(recognizing the clandestine nature of conspiracies). 
 124. See Complaint at 2, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 
1:18-cv-00747, 2018 WL 4386565 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (prosecuting naked 
no-poach agreements in which direct evidence of a contract between competitors 
or internal communications documenting an agreement were available);  see also 
Adobe Complaint, supra note 67 (same);  Lucasfilm Complaint, supra note 67, at 
*2 (same);  eBay Complaint, supra note 67, at *2 (same). 
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conspirators are careful not to discuss no-poaching agreements 
over email or other easily documented forms of communications, 
this is not the only way to uncover evidence of an express 
agreement.125 
Evidence of an express agreement may range from a meeting 
of minds sufficient to form an enforceable contract to the 
ambiguous situation where parties refuse to utter words of 
acceptance after requesting common action.126 The line drawn for 
when communications become a conspiracy is not a clear one and 
is usually an issue for the trier of fact.127 However, the Supreme 
Court’s approach in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.128 
illustrates the theoretical underpinnings of this inquiry.129 In this 
case, the defendants formed an informal “gentlemen’s agreement” 
where each major oil company would purchase an unspecified 
quantity of excess distress oil from specified suppliers (or “dancing 
partners”) to exploit gasoline spot markets and extract monopoly 
prices.130 The case effectuates the “statutory purpose, for even a 
vague understanding between competitors on a common course of 
action involves both collective decision-making on future behavior 
and some degree of express mutual assurance . . . .”131 And when 
this understanding is between competitors, a conspiracy is more 
likely to be inferred.132 
In the no-poach context, an agreement is the key component 
that makes the arrangement beneficial to each party.133 Without 
                                                                                                     
 125. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003) (stating 
that direct communication is not necessary to establish a conspiracy under 
Sherman Act § 1). 
 126. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing an antitrust conspiracy reduced to its most basic form). 
 127. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410 (2d ed. 2003) 
(explaining the fact intensive nature of the inquiry). 
 128. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 105, 218–20 (1940) 
(describing the theoretical approach to finding an antitrust conspiracy). 
 129. See id. (describing the theoretical factual inquiry that a court must 
undergo to find a conspiracy under the Sherman Act). 
 130. See id. at 177–96 (describing the alleged agreements among gas 
companies that amount to an antitrust violation). 
 131. 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003). 
 132. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003) 
(highlighting the increased scrutiny of communications between competitors). 
 133. See No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate 
and Prosecute No-Poach and Wage-Fixing Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
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an agreement, a company would simply lose its own employees 
while halting its recruitment efforts.134 The restraint would not be 
effective in the absence of mutual assurances and 
collective-decision making.135 As seen in the agencies’ enforcement 
actions, this fact seems to make the existence of direct and 
circumstantial evidence more likely.136 A company would not be 
likely to engage in this practice with just a wink and a nod.137 
Further, this practice would need to be communicated and policed 
internally.138 If explicit communications between the companies 
are not available, evidence of meetings or other potential collective 
decision-making behavior between the firms may support an 
express agreement.139 
2.  Inferring a Conspiracy Through “Plus Factors” 
Beyond direct and circumstantial evidence of an express 
agreement, several other “plus factors” may also help distinguish 
an agreement from conscious parallelism.140 The Court in 
                                                                                                     
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-
2018/antitrust-division-continues-investigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wage-
fixing-agreements (last updated Apr. 10, 2018) (last visited Dec. 7, 2019) (stating 
that no-poach agreements are ineffective unless they are of mutual benefit to the 
agreeing parties) [https://perma.cc/BE4C-MK5B]. 
 134. See In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2850, 2019 WL 
2542241, *14–15 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019) (describing plausible motivations for 
entering into a no-poach agreement). 
 135. See, e.g., In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 
1181–84 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing the factual allegations of a joint anti-
solicitation scheme where the mutual benefit expressly motivated the parties’ 
entry into an agreement). 
 136. See, e.g., id. (describing e-mail correspondence and other facts supporting 
the existence of a conspiracy).  
 137. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing the level of conduct generally required to find that an agreement 
existed). 
 138. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (describing the role of senior executives in enforcing the 
Silicon Valley no-poach agreements). 
 139. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing the factual inquiry for finding a conspiracy in the absence of an 
express agreement). 
 140. See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.141 stated 
that conduct “as consistent with permissible competition as with 
illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of 
antitrust conspiracy . . . a plaintiff . . . must present evidence that 
tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently.”142 The Court identified two fact specific inquiries 
relevant to this question:  first, whether the defendant had a 
rational motive to join the conspiracy and second, whether the 
conduct is consistent with the defendant’s individual 
self-interest.143 
In response, courts have devised a series of “plus factors” that 
tend to indicate the likelihood of an agreement.144 In accordance 
with Matsushita’s two questions, the most important factor is 
whether, acting alone, the conduct is contrary to the parties’ 
economic self-interests but would be beneficial when executed 
collectively.145 This factor alone is often sufficient to state a 
claim.146 The next most important factor is whether a joint act of 
standardization such as a price change occurs (especially in times 
                                                                                                     
360 (3d Cir. 2015) (identifying a non-exhaustive list of “plus factors” to distinguish 
conspiracy from conscious parallelism—when companies act similarly due to 
independent decision-making based on rational market decisions). 
 141. See Matsushita Electr. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
588 (1986) (stating the modern standard for agreement under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. (identifying the two major questions distinguishing agreement 
and conscious parallelism). 
 144. See, e.g., Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d 383 at 398 (identifying a 
non-exhaustive list of “plus” factors). 
 145. See Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939) 
(“[W]ithout substantially unanimous action . . . there was risk of a substantial 
loss of business and good will . . . but that with it there was the prospect of 
increased profits.”);  see also, Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 
346 U.S. 537, 540–42 (1954) (upholding a jury verdict where evidence showed 
each party’s self-interest should have led them to refuse the scheme);  Intervest, 
Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir. 2003);  Re/Max Int’l v. Realty 
One, 173 F.3d 995, 1009–10 (6th Cir. 1999);  Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 
921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991);  Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal, 
639 F. Supp. 2d 877, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 2009);  In re Currency Conversion Fee 
Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 146. See, e.g., Starr v. Sony Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 327 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“[P]laintiffs have alleged behavior that would plausibly contravene each 
defendant’s self-interest ‘in the absence of similar behavior by rivals.’” (quoting 6 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1415a (2d ed. 2003))). 
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where price should move in a contrary manner based on supply 
and demand).147 Finally, if the company cannot offer a legitimate 
explanation for the action and posits pre-textual justifications, this 
further reinforces the likelihood of concerted action.148 Ultimately, 
any fact delineating whether the action resulted from an 
agreement may constitute a “plus factor”;  all of these facts would 
be weighed in the aggregate to determine the existence of a 
conspiracy.149 
A consideration of these core “plus factors” weighs in favor of 
condemning no-poach agreements. Facially, a restriction on hiring 
which prevents a company from competing for the best employees 
is not in an individual company’s self-interest.150 Although a 
defendant may argue that it is beneficial for a company to stop 
hiring competitor employees in order to prevent the loss of its own 
employees, this is not a practice that a company can effectuate on 
its own without an agreement—outside of its own internal 
retention programs.151 By their very nature, no-poaching 
                                                                                                     
 147. See Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,805 (1946) (noting the 
defendants’ behavior was incongruent with supply and demand);  see also 
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952) 
(same);  Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 419, 
425–26 (D. Md. 2011) (same);  In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies 
Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999–1001 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same). 
 148. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 805 (noting the analysis of “plus 
factors” functions in the aggregate);  see also Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 
F.2d 1473, 147–80 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). 
 149. See, e.g., Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 
698–99 (1962) (“[P]laintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without 
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate 
clean after scrutiny of each.”). 
 150. See, e.g., To Raise Wages, Make Companies Compete for Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/opinion/oregon-
noncompete.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (discussing how wages increased in 
Oregon after a law was passed making it easier for employees to take positions at 
different companies, thus creating a more competitive pool of employees) 
[https://perma.cc/4FHB-WHDV]. 
 151. See Michael A. Lindsay, McDonald’s and Medicine: Developments in the 
Law of No-Poaching and Wage-Fixing Agreements, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST, Spring 
2019, at 18 (describing UNC’s retention program put in place to respond to Duke’s 
attempts to poach employees). 
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agreements require collective conspiratorial action with an 
understanding of mutual assurance in a common scheme.152 
When companies successfully conspire to restrict hiring, those 
employees are then less able to switch or obtain higher wages—
allowing employers to depress wages.153 As a result, evidence of 
depressed wages, especially during a shortage of labor, would be 
indicative of a conspiracy because this trend would be economically 
infeasible.154 Finally, outside of certain justifications discussed in 
Part IV of this Note (such as a desire to protect a joint venture’s 
progress or to protect intellectual property rights), it will likely be 
difficult for a company to provide an alternate explanation for its 
refusal to hire certain companies’ employees.155 
B.  An Additional Challenge in Proving an Agreement Between 
Vertical Entities:  The Colgate Unilateral Action Doctrine 
Although the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Service Corp.156 established that horizontal and vertical 
conspiracies are shown in the same manner, vertical elements 
present additional challenges in proving an agreement.157 In this 
same decision, the Court revived the Colgate “unilateralism” 
doctrine, which allows a firm to announce its pricing policies and 
terms of dealing with distributors without soliciting a 
conspiracy.158 A firm that complies with the policy is also free from 
liability since compliance constitutes its unilateral decision to act 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. (describing the type of collective behavior that could culminate in 
a conspiracy). 
 153. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26 (describing the competitive effects of 
no-poach agreements). 
 154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing economically 
irrational trends as a significant “plus factor”). 
 155. See infra Part IV (noting the strict requirements in asserting a 
procompetitive justification).  
 156. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) 
(explaining the evidentiary standard for showing a plausible conspiracy). 
 157. See id. (“There must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably 
tends to prove . . . a conscious commitment to a common scheme . . . .”). 
 158. See id. at 762 (describing the limited circumstances that unilateral, 
independent decisions by a firm to comply with another’s terms of business do not 
form an antitrust conspiracy). 
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in its own economic self-interest.159 However, a closer look at the 
development of this doctrine reveals that it is a narrow exception 
and that no-poach agreements are unlikely to fall within it.160 
In United States v. Colgate & Co.,161 the manufacturer 
announced a uniform dealer pricing policy and stated that 
non-complying dealers would be terminated.162 However, there 
was no averment that the parties bound themselves in a common 
scheme to maintain prices.163 Colgate simply announced the prices 
that it planned to sell its products;  it did not meet with dealers in 
order to influence their decisions.164 The vendors could, in fact, 
receive and give away Colgate’s products;  they did not enter a 
preemptive agreement forbidding them from selling at other 
prices.165 The manufacturer was free to exercise his discretion to 
terminate the dealer and the supplier would be able to decide 
whether or not to comply—even if the alternative was to face 
termination.166 However, the Court made it clear that where 
evidence of an agreement exists, Colgate will not otherwise excuse 
the conduct.167 
                                                                                                     
 159. See id. at 761 (explaining the rationale for the Colgate doctrine). 
 160. See infra notes 161–194 and accompanying text (discussing the 
development of the Colgate doctrine). 
 161. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 303–04 (1919) 
(distinguishing a unilateral decision from a conspiracy). 
 162. See id. (distinguishing a unilateral decision from a conspiracy). 
 163. See id. at 305 (“The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no 
averment is made of any contract or agreement having been entered into whereby 
the defendant . . . and his customers, bound themselves to enhance and maintain 
prices.”). 
 164. See id. (describing Colgate’s limited contact with its distributors in 
forming its independent policy). 
 165. See id. (noting the limited control exercised by Colgate in terms of its 
distributors’ acquiescence). 
 166. See id. (showing that Colgate product distributors retained their own 
independent decision-making processes). 
 167. See United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, 252 U.S. 85, 98 (1920) (stating 
that the contracts at issue were unlike the policy in Colgate where the parties had 
failed to show that Colgate “made agreements, either express or implied, which 
undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale prices.”);  see also Frey 
& Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 212–14 (1921) (stating that the 
existence of an agreement should have been decided by the jury rather than being 
dismissed under Colgate). 
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In later cases, the Supreme Court attempted to further clarify 
the point at which unilateral decision-making becomes concerted 
action.168 In FTC v. Beech Nut Packing Co.,169 the defendant not 
only refused to sell to wholesalers who did not abide by listed retail 
prices but also required that they restrict their sales to 
sub-retailers who complied with the policy.170 The Supreme Court 
held that a manufacturer may refuse to sell to vendors who deviate 
from list prices but may not “go beyond the exercise of this right, 
and by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly 
hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the 
channels of interstate trade.”171 
Forty years later, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.172 read Beech-Nut as limiting Colgate 
to mere acquiescence in a manufacturer’s published pricing lists.173 
The court found that the scheme in Bausch & Lomb was 
comparable to that in Beech-Nut in that it went beyond wholesaler 
adherence to resale prices by restricting its wholesaler’s customers 
as a part of a larger scheme.174 Specifically, Bausch & Lomb agreed 
not to sell pink tinted glass or lenses to any of Soft-Lite’s 
competitors and not to compete with Soft-Lite in the marketing of 
any other pink tinted lens.175 The Court stated that Bausch & 
Lomb participated in the distribution scheme by accepting 
“Soft-Lite’s proffer of a plan of distribution by cooperating in prices, 
limit[ing] sales to and approval of retail licensees. That is 
sufficient.”176 
                                                                                                     
 168. See infra notes 173–98 (discussing the development of the Colgate 
doctrine). 
 169. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (describing the 
Beech-Nut policy). 
 170. See id. at 445 (describing the Beech-Nut policy). 
 171. See id. at 453 (summarizing Schrader’s Son and Frey & Son). 
 172. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721–23 
(1944) (comparing the facts of the case to Beech-Nut). 
 173. See id. (“As in the Beech-Nut case, there is more here than mere 
acquiescence of wholesalers in Sofe-Lite’s published resale price list.”). 
 174. See id. (stating the rationale for finding an agreement). 
 175. See id. at 717 (describing the Bausch & Lomb marketing plan). 
 176. See id. at 721 (citing Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 
221 (1939)). 
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In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,177 the Supreme Court 
summarized Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, adding that a proffer 
occurs when “a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual 
self-interest to bring about general voluntary acquiescence . . . and 
takes affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence.”178 The 
Court in Parke, Davis noted evidence of an express agreement—
consistent with the type of facts outlined in Part II.B to evidence a 
horizontal agreement.179 The defendant negotiated directly with 
retailers charging less than specified prices, received their 
assurances, and used those assurances as well as the complaints 
of these retailers to effectuate the scheme.180 In other words, 
Parke, Davis did not “rest with the simple announcement to the 
trade of its policy . . . [i]t was only by actively bringing about 
substantial unanimity among the competitors that Parke, Davis 
was able to gain adherence to its policy.”181 In light of these 
individual negotiations and meetings, a traditional agreement 
could be shown if, after the meeting, the dealer then adhered to 
these prices.182 
As in Parke, Davis, evidence of an express agreement was also 
decisive in Monsanto and illustrates that coercive conduct is a 
“plus factor” that is more likely to occur in vertical agreement 
cases.183 In this case, Monsanto approached two price-cutting 
distributors and advised them that if they did not meet resale price 
limits, their supply of herbicide would be cut off.184 When one of 
                                                                                                     
 177. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960) 
(describing the standards for finding an agreement under Bausch & Lomb Optical 
and Beech-Nut). 
 178. See id. (articulating the importance of independent decision making 
when classifying actions as unilateral). 
 179. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the analysis to show a conspiracy 
through evidence of an express agreement).  
 180. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 46 (listing the defendant’s 
intervening actions with respect to its distributors and retailers). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 46 n.6 (stating that if the suspended retailer resumed 
adherence after the interview with Parke, Davis management, the companies will 
have entered into an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act). 
 183. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764–67 
(1984) (describing Monsanto’s scheme). 
 184. See id. (detailing the retail price maintenance scheme implemented by 
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the distributors refused, Monsanto complained to its parent 
company and subsequently received assurances of compliance.185 
The Supreme Court found that this direct evidence of an 
agreement was “plainly relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of 
minds.”186 
Further, the court considered the timing of Monsanto’s threat 
during shipping season when herbicide was in short supply;  it 
stated that “the jury could have reasonably concluded that 
Monsanto sought this agreement at a time when it was able to use 
supply as a lever to force compliance.187 Additionally, the court 
evaluated a dealer’s letter to its customers, written after a meeting 
with Monsanto;  the letter stated that the dealer was sure that 
Monsanto outlets would maintain a minimum price level and that 
Monsanto dictated the “rules of the game.”188 The Court found that 
the evidence tended to support the existence of a conspiracy.189 
More recent cases also support the inference of an illegal 
agreement based on evidence of threats, incentives to comply, 
individual negotiations or other actions beyond complaints or fear 
of termination.190 
                                                                                                     
Monsanto Co.). 
 185. See id. (describing Monsanto’s actions with respect to non-compliance 
with set prices). 
 186. See id. (relying on direct evidence to show an agreement). 
 187. See id. at 765 n.10 (relying additionally on circumstantial evidence to 
support the existence of an agreement). 
 188. See id. (relying additionally on circumstantial evidence to support the 
existence of an agreement). 
 189. See id. (finding that direct and circumstantial evidence of an agreement 
supported the jury’s finding and was sufficient because it tended to exclude 
independent action). 
 190. See Miles Distrib. v. Specialty Constr. Brands, 476 F.3d 442, 451–52 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (stating that price complaints are insufficient, without more, to 
establish vertical agreements);  see also  InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 
F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) (“InterVest does not present evidence indicating that 
Bloomberg was threatened into doing so or that there was an agreement . . . .”);  
Viazis v. Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 763–65 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating 
that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant threatened the 
distributor);  Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that evidence of responses to distributor complaints, threats to 
non-complying distributors, and monitoring supported the existence of an 
agreement);  DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 
1186, 1194–96 (11th Cir. 1993) (condemning distributor who was given kickbacks 
to maintain appearance of equal resale prices). 
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To summarize, Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis 
read Colgate narrowly to find that each company executed 
restraints going beyond a unilateral (and purely vertically 
oriented) decision to select dealers who would abide by listed resale 
prices.191 Each company extended its influence beyond the 
selection of its vertically oriented vendors, using the threat of 
termination to effectuate a larger scheme that went beyond this 
relationship.192 The Colgate doctrine does not shelter this 
conduct.193 This type of scheme often accompanies direct evidence 
of an agreement which invalidates the defense as well; in Parke, 
Davis and Monsanto, the companies needed to communicate 
directly with and even pressure its dealers into compliance with 
the aim of perpetuating a larger (horizontal) scheme.194 
Under this framework, no-poach agreements are unlikely to 
be protected by the Colgate doctrine because they are not limited 
to terminating vertically oriented partners that fail to abide with 
a firm’s sales or distribution policies for its product.195 The intent 
of a successful no-poach agreement is to carry out a greater 
conspiracy between competing firms in the labor market, even if 
those firms are the vertical entities themselves.196 For example, a 
conceivable scenario with vertical elements could occur when a 
robot component manufacturer (who makes part of a robot) asks 
its customer—a robot manufacturer—to stop poaching its tech 
employees.197  
                                                                                                     
 191. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (summarizing 
Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis). 
 192. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (describing Beech-Nut, 
Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis). 
 193. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (introducing 
the theory that announcement and termination constitutes unilateral behavior). 
 194. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (outlining Beech-Nut, 
Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis). 
 195. See Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (introducing the theory that 
announcement and termination constitutes unilateral behavior). 
 196. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employment Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 
1103, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining the purpose for entering into a no-poach 
agreement with market competitors). 
 197. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(describing horizontal and vertical agreements). 
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In this scenario, and in the franchise context, the no-poach 
restraint is not truly vertical because it has nothing to do with the 
joint effort of manufacturing robots or burgers.198 The restraints 
extend beyond this vertical relationship and impact their 
horizontal relationship in the labor market.199 In other words, 
these restraints would condition (vertical) business dealings in the 
downstream market on the firms’ behavior with its horizontal 
competitors in the labor market.200 No-poach agreements occur in 
the same way that Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, Parke, Davis, and 
Monsanto used their positions in a vertical downstream market to 
condition a larger horizontal restriction among their vendors.201 
If the robot manufacturer is dependent on the robot 
component manufacturer’s machine parts, it may feel pressured 
into accepting the offer.202 Similarly, a franchisee may only be able 
to participate in a  franchise if it agrees to a contractual no-poach 
provision.203 As seen in Monsanto, evidence of an agreement—such 
as individual communications followed by the conspirator’s 
compliance—would foreclose Colgate protection.204 In a case with 
vertical elements, power imbalances between the firms are more 
likely to result in this type of coercive conduct.205 Further, it is 
unlikely that a company would publicly announce a no-poach 
policy and give free rein to partnering companies to decide on their 
                                                                                                     
 198. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“This case . . . is not about competition 
for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees, 
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos 
within a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”). 
 199. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26 (describing the competitive effects of 
no-poach agreements). 
 200. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier 
cases in the Colgate line of cases). 
 201. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier 
cases in the Colgate line of cases). 
 202. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764–
67 (1984) (describing Monsanto’s conduct with its wholesalers). 
 203. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 
3105955, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (outlining the contractual no-poach 
agreement provision in detail). 
 204. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (describing the evidentiary standard for 
showing an agreement). 
 205. See id. (contrasting a major company such as Monsanto with a family 
business like Spray-Rite). 
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own whether or not to comply.206 It is much more likely that a 
company would have certain key business relationships and would 
discuss a no-poaching policy with these firms directly.207 As a 
result, the likelihood of evidence of direct collusion would 
potentially foreclose Colgate protection as well.208 
C.  Combining Vertical and Horizontal Elements:  Proving a Hub-
and-Spoke Conspiracy 
One theory rearing its head in the franchise cases is the 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy.209 According to this theory, a plaintiff 
can demonstrate a horizontal agreement between competitors who 
are connected to a common “hub” through a series of vertical 
agreements.210 Successfully proving a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy 
can have a dramatic effect;  the Supreme Court has consistently 
established that per se rules applicable to horizontal restraints 
also apply to these conspiracies.211 The reason is that a 
                                                                                                     
 206. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 
1119 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting an e-mail that demonstrated the understanding 
that an agreement was necessary to make internal no-poach policies effective). 
 207. See, e.g., id. (describing the various business relationships Steve Jobs 
leveraged to garner widespread participation in a non-solicitation scheme).  
 208. See supra note 195–208 and accompanying text (explaining the Colgate 
framework). 
 209. See infra notes 210–212 and accompanying text (discussing the hub-and- 
spoke theory). 
 210. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing 
horizontal and vertical agreements, finding that the agreement at issue was a 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy). 
 211. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) 
(inferring a per se illegal horizontal conspiracy where the agreement only 
benefitted competitors if they each agree to similar terms with the ‘hub’—who 
facilitates and assures this compliance);  see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 
316 U.S. 265 (1942) (reaffirming the Interstate Circuit inference standard);  
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46 (1960) (stating that Parke, 
Davis’ conduct was not covered by the Colgate unilateral action doctrine and a 
horizontal conspiracy was formed when it “sought assurances of compliance and 
got them, as well as the compliance itself.”);  United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
384 U.S. 127, 143 (1966) (inferring a horizontal conspiracy when “[t]he dealers 
collaborated . . . among themselves and with [the manufacturer] both to enlist the 
aid of [the manufacturer] and to enforce dealers’ promises to forsake the 
discounters.”). 
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hub-and-spoke conspiracy simply incorporates vertical elements in 
order to facilitate horizontal collusion.212 
The Supreme Court handed down five decisions between 1940 
and 1970 inferring horizontal conspiracies from a series of vertical 
relationships.213 These decisions recognizing hub-and-spoke 
agreements have never been overturned.214 The decisions 
generally hold that the totality of circumstances surrounding 
vertical restraints may also provide circumstantial evidence of a 
horizontal conspiracy.215 The disparate legal treatment of vertical 
and horizontal relationships in antitrust law did not exist during 
this time but recent Supreme Court cases continue to endorse the 
older hub-and-spoke decisions.216 Each of the more recent decisions 
continue to recognize that vertical agreements facilitating a 
horizontal conspiracy may warrant per se treatment even if 
vertical agreements are evaluated under the rule of reason.217 
The Seventh Circuit’s landmark case, Toys “R” Us v. FTC,218 
forcefully articulated the legal standards for the hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy (in keeping with past Supreme Court decisions).219 In 
this case, the toy retailer faced competition from discount 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 202 (describing the inference standard 
for hub-and-spoke conspiracies). 
 213. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing four 
Supreme Court hub-and-spoke cases). 
 214. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing four 
Supreme Court cases that have not been overturned). 
 215. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the 
inference standard for a hub-and-spoke agreement). 
 216. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n. 28 (1977) 
(“There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from 
horizontal restrictions . . . but we do not regard the problems of proof as 
sufficiently great to justify a per se rule.”);  see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734–35 (1988) (explaining that the per se rule applied 
also in Klor’s, Parke, Davis, and General Motors);  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892–94 (2007) (explaining that price 
maintenance agreements could facilitate horizontal cartels). 
 217. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94 (explaining that although vertical and 
horizontal agreements are treated differently under the law, these elements can 
blur together to form horizontal conspiracies). 
 218. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415, 574–82 (1998) (discussing the 
agreement between Toys R Us and its manufacturers). 
 219. See id. (stating that the agreement between Toys “R” Us and its 
manufacturers mirrored the conspiracy in the Interstate Circuit decision but also 
included direct evidence of an agreement). 
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warehouse clubs and met individually with each of its 
manufacturers to ask them to restrict offerings to warehouse 
clubs.220 After explaining the policy, Toys “R” Us asked each 
manufacturer how it intended to proceed.221 Each manufacturer 
eventually agreed to sell the differentiated products in order to 
eliminate competition for Toys “R” Us on the condition that the 
others also agreed to do so.222 
The FTC promptly found that these negotiations constituted 
vertical agreements and discarded the defendant’s arguments that 
the agreement was governed by the Colgate doctrine.223 These 
points were not challenged on appeal but the Seventh Circuit still 
condemned the Colgate defense, stating that “unilateral actions of 
the sort protected by Monsanto and Colgate are not the same thing 
as a retailer’s request to the manufacturer to change the latter’s 
business practice.”224 As in Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, Toys 
“R” Us went beyond announcing its terms of sale to its distributors 
in order to effectuate a larger scheme.225 
Further, the court went on to acknowledge that the ten 
vertical agreements formed the spokes of a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy.226 Toys “R” Us worked for years to establish vertical 
arrangements but was unsuccessful until the seven manufacturers 
finally accepted “on the condition that their competitors would do 
the same.”227 This crucial fact was lethal to Toys “R” Us’ defense 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930–32 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing 
the facts specific to the alleged conspiracy). 
   221. See id. (noting Toys “R” Us’ role in policing the conspiracy). 
 222. See id. at 934 (stating that the parties were “forcing the clubs’ customers 
to buy products they did not want, and frustrating customers’ ability to make 
direct price comparisons of club prices and Toys R Us prices). 
 223. See id. at 937 (“The Commission rejected the point, because it found that 
TRU had repeatedly crossed the line from unilateral to concerted behavior in 
illegal ways . . . .”). 
 224. See id. (“[U]nilateral actions of the sort protected 
by Monsanto and Colgate are not the same thing as a retailer’s request to the 
manufacturer to change the latter’s business practice.”). 
 225. See id. at 932 (describing the efforts of Toys R Us). 
 226. See id. (“TRU was not content to stop with vertical agreements. Instead, 
the Commission found, it decided to go further.”). 
 227. See id. at (noting that one executive “made a point to tell each of the 
vendors that we spoke to that we would be talking to our other key suppliers.”). 
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and was the key to establishing the horizontal rim of the wheel.228 
Using a variety of “plus factors,” the Seventh Circuit found 
sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility of independent 
action.229 
First, it would have been contrary to a manufacturer’s 
self-interest to enter into these agreements independently.230 The 
manufacturers wanted to diversify from Toys “R” Us products;  
warehouse clubs were a lucrative opportunity and were beneficial 
for consumers due to their lower mark-ups.231 Second, the court 
found that the manufacturers would not have engaged in this 
practice independently;  the companies were “reluctant to give up 
a fast-growing, and profitable channel of distribution” and feared 
that a rival “who broke ranks and sold to the clubs might gain sales 
at their expense.”232 
This analysis was more recently confirmed by the Second 
Circuit when it inferred a horizontal conspiracy in United States v. 
Apple233—also known as the “eBook case.”234 Citing Toys “R” Us 
and Interstate Circuit, the court recognized the existence of a 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy orchestrated by Apple when it entered 
the e-book market.235 In order to compete with Amazon, the court 
found that Apple enlisted the Big Six publishers in the United 
States into most-favored-nation clauses in which the publishers 
retained the right to set prices of e-books (set at caps of $14.99, 
                                                                                                     
 228. See id. at 934 (analyzing the horizontal conspiracy).  
 229. See id. at 936 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to dispel the 
independent self-interest theory). 
 230. See id. (noting the assurances that the warehousing clubs received in 
joining the conspiracy). 
 231. See id. (“[I]nternal documents from the manufacturers revealed that they 
were trying to expand, not to restrict, the number of their major retail outlets 
and . . . [t]hey were specifically interested in cultivating a relationship with the 
warehouse clubs.”). 
 232. See id. at 932 (stating that the behavior was not consistent with the 
firms’ independent competitive motives). 
 233. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 313–14 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(finding the existence of an antitrust conspiracy among publishing companies). 
 234. See id. (stating that the district court correctly found that Apple 
orchestrated a conspiracy among the Big Six publishers in order to increase 
prices). 
 235. See id. at 297 (stating that the conspiracy was organized in order to avoid 
the “necessity of competing with Amazon.”). 
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$12.99, and $9.99).236 This structure created strong incentives to 
increase prices and it led to this exact result.237 In finding a 
horizontal conspiracy, the court relied on the contractual 
agreements offered by Apple—which would only be attractive if the 
publishers acted collectively to shift Amazon away from a discount 
strategy to an agency model.238 The court also examined the 
collusive nature of the publishing industry and the fact that the 
Big Six CEOs met on a quarterly basis without counsel and “had 
no qualms communicating about the need to act together.”239 The 
court found that there was sufficient evidence showing that an 
agreement was “more likely than not,” stressing that the character 
and “effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it 
and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a 
whole.”240 
Franchise agreements should be condemned under the same 
analysis.241 The contractual provisions in franchise agreements 
often implement no-poach agreements between restaurants, which 
are horizontal entities competing for the same labor pool.242 The 
                                                                                                     
 236. See id. (describing the scheme set forth by Apple). 
 237. See id. at 300 (“Because they ‘did not compete with each other on price,’ 
but over authors and agents, the publishers ‘felt no hesitation in freely discussing 
Amazon’s prices with each other and their joint strategies for raising those 
prices.’” (quoting United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013))). 
 238. See id. (detailing the evidence indicating the existence of a horizontal 
conspiracy). 
 239. See id. (describing the close-knit nature of communications between the 
publishing companies). 
 240. See id. (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 
690, 699 (1962) (applying the per se standard although the dissent judge argued 
for a rule of reason standard)). 
 241. See No-Poach Approach, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/no-
poach-approach (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (last visited Oct. 09, 2019) 
(explaining that in three cases involving franchise agreements, the Antitrust 
Division filed statements of interest urging that the correct analysis was the rule 
of reason) [https://perma.cc/4ZTU-RCPW]. 
 242. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld LLP, A Fresh Approach to 
No-Poach Provisions in Franchise Agreements (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/1/0/v2/102953/A-Fresh-Approach-to-
No-Poach-Provisions-in-Franchise-Agreements..pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2019) 
(explaining the issues of no-poach analysis in franchise agreements) 
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vertical agreement is present through the standard contract 
provisions between the franchisor and franchisee.243 The issue is 
demonstrating the horizontal relationship between franchisees.244 
However, as in Toys “R” Us, the franchise contract’s no-poach 
provision only makes sense for franchisees on the condition that 
all other franchisees sign it.245 As shown in Part II.B, the nature of 
no-poach restrictions supports finding a horizontal conspiracy.246 
If franchisees sign this provision without the knowledge that all 
other franchisees will participate, the provision is not in their 
individual self-interest.247 They will simply stop competing in the 
labor market while everyone else continues to do so.248 However, 
with the mutually assured compliance guaranteed by the 
franchisor’s standard contract, a franchisee can safely benefit from 
the no-poach conspiracy.249 The end result is that the franchise can 
deter employee turnover and depress wages through its 
franchisees.250 If the horizontal rim of the agreement is shown in 
this manner, the franchisor and franchisees should then both be 
held liable under the per se rule condemning market allocations.251 
In short, the key to this analysis is to present enough evidence 
pointing to the existence of a horizontal rim;  it is not enough to 
rely on the mere existence of a series of vertical agreements.252 
                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/7W4N-PJVN]. 
 243. See id. (describing a franchise agreement). 
 244. See No-Poach Approach, supra note 241 (explaining that franchisees are 
each independent entities). 
 245. See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (discussing how 
no-poach agreements are only effective when employers conspire). 
 246. See supra Part II.B (describing how the inference standard for horizontal 
agreements applies to no-poach agreements). 
 247. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing an 
anti-competition scheme among toy manufacturers whereby they only 
participated with the knowledge that their competitors participated). 
 248. See id. (explaining the incentives for joining a conspiracy). 
 249. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 2 (N.D. 
Ill. June 25, 2018) (explaining the implications of McDonald’s standard franchise 
agreement). 
 250. See id. (stating that the agreement strengthens the franchisers hiring 
influence and allows the franchisee to keep costs low.) 
 251. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing Supreme 
Court precedent for application of the per se rule when a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy is demonstrated). 
 252. See, e.g., Dickson v. Microsoft, 309 F.3d 193, 203–05 (4th Cir. 2002) 
“NO MORE NO-POACH”   419 
 
Caution is warranted on this point because some courts have 
required more evidence than others.253 In a case implicating the 
musical instrument retailer Guitar Center, the Ninth Circuit 
seemed to nearly require direct evidence of collusion between the 
horizontal conspirators.254 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Guitar Center pressured five leading guitar manufacturers into 
accepting minimum advertising price terms.255 Several significant 
“plus factors” were alleged:  that defendants shared a common 
motive to conspire, the manufacturers acted against their 
self-interest, the manufacturers simultaneously adopted 
substantially similar agreements, an FTC consent decree finding 
that defendants participated in an illegal information exchange, 
and the fact that retail prices rose as the number of units sold 
fell.256 Despite an abundance of circumstantial evidence—
consistent with what the Supreme Court has required in the past—
the Ninth Circuit did not infer a horizontal conspiracy.257 
Additionally, the DOJ’s analysis within its statement of 
interest concerning the Cinnabon litigation also reaffirms that 
evidence beyond the existence of the franchise agreement is 
essential.258 The DOJ seems to suggest, though, that franchise 
                                                                                                     
(stating that vertical distribution agreements between Microsoft and original 
equipment manufacturers was not sufficient to establish a conspiracy among the 
manufacturers without evidence of a rim to the wheel);  PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 315 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that loyalty agreements forcing 
distributors to offer either Pepsi or Coke products exclusively did not, on their 
face, constitute a hub-and-spoke conspiracy). 
 253. Compare In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy."), with 
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Parallel action is 
not by itself, sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy.”). 
 254. See In re Musical Instrs. & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1189 
(9th Cir. 2015) (stating that despite substantial circumstantial evidence, 
“plaintiffs’ “plus factors” add nothing . . . we affirm the judgment of the district 
court dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1 claim.”). 
 255. See id. at 1189–90 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations and theory of 
harm). 
 256. See id. at 1194 (noting the lack of direct evidence while listing six “plus 
factors” alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint). 
 257. See id. at 1189 (stating that the agreement could be indicative of 
conscious parallelism rather than concerted action). 
 258. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 20 (“The key to the per se illegal hub-and-
spoke conspiracy is ‘the existence of a rim to the wheel in the form of an agreement 
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agreements are more likely to be categorized as rimless 
conspiracies where “parallel but independent vertical agreements 
are not per se unlawful; they are subject to the rule of reason.”259 
The agency notes that even if plaintiffs had successfully pleaded 
the rim to the conspiracy, that the “franchise relationship . . . is a 
legitimate business collaboration in which the franchisees operate 
under the same brand.”260 Because of this, the no-poach 
agreements would be considered ancillary restraints to be 
evaluated under the rule of reason.261 First, as explained above, 
there is an argument to condemn franchise no-poach restraints as 
a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and multiple district courts have 
agreed.262 Second, as explained in Part IV, this conclusion that no-
poach agreements are covered by the ancillary restraints doctrine 
is questionable.263 More on point within this section, the ancillary 
restraints concern has no meaning in the analysis for finding a 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy.264  Per se treatment would apply if a 
hub-and-spoke conspiracy is found.265 The rule of reason would 
only become appropriate if the defendant successfully makes out a 
                                                                                                     
among the horizontal competitors.’”).  
 259. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (“Here, there is no indication that 
plaintiffs have successfully pleaded the existence of a ‘rim’ on which to base a 
‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracy.”). 
 260. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (distinguishing franchise no-poach 
agreements from typical hub-and-spoke conspiracies). 
 261. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (“No-poach agreements would thus 
qualify as ancillary restraints if they are reasonably necessary to the legitimate 
franchise collaboration and not overbroad.”). 
 262. See supra notes 241–251 and accompanying text (noting the case for 
condemning franchise no-poach agreements under a hub-and-spoke analysis);  see 
also, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. 
Ill. July 31, 2018) (noting that the claimant plausibly stated a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy where “the ‘hub’ firm enters into a collection of vertical agreements 
with other firms—the ‘spokes’—and those spokes then enter into a collection of 
horizontal agreements that make up the ‘wheel’”). 
 263. See infra Part IV (describing how a defendant would make an ancillary 
pro-competitive justification argument).  
 264. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (describing the 
§ 1 burden-shifting test). 
 265. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) 
(inferring a per se illegal horizontal conspiracy where the agreement only 
benefitted competitors if they each agree to similar terms with the ‘hub’—who 
facilitates and assures this compliance). 
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pro-competitive justification defense after the plaintiff meets their 
burden.266  
D.  Evading the Intra-Enterprise Doctrine or Copperweld Defense 
One final issue that arises in the context of proving an 
agreement between vertically oriented firms is the 
intra-enterprise doctrine.267 When a corporation coordinates its 
activities with a parent, subsidiary, affiliated corporations, or 
agents, these actions may fall outside of § 1 according to the 
Copperweld doctrine.268 The boundary for firms which can be 
“Copperwelded” is unclear, however, since this case involved a 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.269 The Supreme 
Court explicitly left the door open in this decision as to which other 
situations warrant exemption from § 1.270 Lower courts have 
extended this doctrine outside of the parent and wholly owned 
subsidiary relationship, however.271 Most courts have held that the 
Copperweld doctrine extends to agreements between sister 
corporations.272 Similarly, some courts have held that corporations 
                                                                                                     
 266. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“If the plaintiff carries its 
burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rational 
for the restraint.”). 
 267. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984) 
(“[P]rovides that § 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its 
subsidiary are subject to common ownership . . . .”). 
 268. See id. at 753 (stating that a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary must 
be viewed as a single enterprise which unilaterally makes decisions). 
 269. See id. (“Review of this case calls directly into question whether the 
coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary can, in the legal 
sense contemplated by § 1 of the Sherman Act, constitute a combination or 
conspiracy.”). 
 270. See id. 753 (construing the facts narrowly as pertaining to a wholly 
owned subsidiary and parent company). 
 271. See Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cty., 93 F.3d 1515, 
1529 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[S]taff physicians may in certain contexts be agents of the 
hospital for purposes of state action immunity.”).  
 272. See generally Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001);  
Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 
1990);  Odishelidza v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 853 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1988);  
Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 
1987);  Greenwood Utils. Comm’n v. Miss. Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1497 n. 8 
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owned by the same holding group are incapable of conspiring.273 
Most courts have found that parents and majority-owned 
subsidiaries are incapable of conspiring although the degree of 
control required has never been precisely defined.274 
However, in 2010, the Supreme Court provided some 
clarifying guidance, as if to steer the courts away from more 
formalistic rule-setting, in its American Needle, Inc. NFL 
decision.275 The Court revisited the Copperweld doctrine, noting 
that the key to the analysis is “whether the parties act on interests 
separate from those of the firm itself” or if the agreement 
“joins . . . separate decisionmakers” pursuing separate economic 
interests.276 In other words, if the parties are joined in an 
agreement but have independent economic interests, they are not 
acting unilaterally as one entity.277 
In 1993, before the current spotlight on no-poach agreements 
and before American Needle, the Ninth Circuit stated in Williams 
v. I.B. Fishcher Nevada278 that franchisors and franchisees of a 
fast-food restaurant cannot conspire under the antitrust laws.279 
The claim theorized that “no-switching” agreements by 
Jack-in-the-Box constituted a group boycott (rather than a 
                                                                                                     
(5th Cir. 1985). 
 273. See, e.g., Century Oil Tool Co. v. Prod. Specialties, 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 
(5th Cir. 1984) (stating that there is no difference between two a parent and 
wholly owned subsidiary and two corporations wholly owned by the same 
persons). 
 274. See, e.g., Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, 54 F.3d 1125, 1133 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (stating that a 99.92% owned subsidiary is ‘Copperwelded’);  Computer 
Identics Corp. v. S. Pac. Co., 756 F.2d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that an 
80% owned subsidiary cannot conspire with its parent). 
 275. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196 
(2010) (holding that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply to member teams of a 
sports league since the inquiry was not based on legal structure but competitive 
realities). 
 276. See id. at 184 (highlighting the importance of evaluating competitive 
realities rather than legal structure).  
 277. See id. at 191 (“[W]e have eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor 
of a functional consideration of how the parties involved . . . actually operate.”). 
 278. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that franchisors and franchisees were incapable of conspiring). 
 279. See id. at 447 (stating that the franchisor and franchisees’ interests 
continue beyond the payment of the licensing fee). 
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horizontal market allocation of the labor market).280 Specifically, 
franchisees could not offer employment to another franchisee’s 
manager within six months of the manager’s termination without 
a release from the franchisee.281 The court found that the degree of 
control and uniformity that the centrally managed franchisor 
demanded from its franchisees supported the existence of a 
“common enterprise.”282 The court looked past evidence that each 
franchise could charge its own prices, that the franchise agreement 
called its franchisees “independent contractors,” and the argument 
that the relationship was more appropriately categorized as a 
licensing relationship.283 
However, this decision predates the Supreme Court’s view in 
American Needle that “the inquiry is one of competitive reality.”284 
In this decision, the Court held that NFL teams were 
independently owned and managed businesses that competed with 
one another.285 The Court focused on the fact that the teams 
typically pursue their own individual efforts when they license 
intellectual property rather than the interests of the whole 
league.286 In other words, “[t]o a firm making hats, the Saints and 
the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable 
trademarks.”287 The teams compete against each other in the 
market for intellectual property and are capable of conspiring 
under § 1 by jointly authorizing NFL Properties to award exclusive 
licenses on their behalf.288 
                                                                                                     
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030–33 (D. Nev. 
1992) (describing the independence of the franchisees and franchisors). 
 283. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs’ contrary arguments). 
 284. See American Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196 
(2010) (stating that the inquiry is one of competitive reality). 
 285. See id. (holding that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply to member 
teams of a sports league since the inquiry was not based on legal structure but 
competitive reality). 
 286. See id. at 197 (“The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary 
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic 
of independent action.”). 
 287. See id. (explaining that NFL teams are competitors in the market for 
licensed merchandise). 
 288. See id. (“[T]he teams voted to authorize NFLP to grant exclusive licenses, 
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No-poach agreements operate in a similar fashion.289 Each 
franchisee pursues its own independent economic interests 
through hiring and recruitment efforts.290 It is in each franchise 
restaurant’s best interest to compete for high-quality employees in 
order to increase productivity and profitability.291 Like any other 
no-poach restraint and like the restraint in American Needle, a 
franchise no-poach restraint curbs competition among competing 
entities.292 This allows entities to act against their individual 
competitive interests by conspiring to depress wages and prevent 
employee turnover between them.293 This is the key to establishing 
that vertically related firms are separate entities under § 1.294 
As a final point, it did not matter to the Supreme Court in 
American Needle that the league, by its nature, required the teams’ 
cooperation in order to compete against other sports leagues or 
forms of entertainment.295 The Court seemed reluctant to broadly 
immunize football leagues and other ventures from the reach of 
antitrust law in this way.296 Instead, the Court stated that this 
question of cooperation is better suited to assessing the legitimacy 
of a pro-competitive justification.297 This analysis overrules the 
                                                                                                     
and NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive 10-year license . . . .”).  
 289. See Ogden v. Little Caesar, 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 633 (E.D. Mich. 2019) 
(“[I]n the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos within 
a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”).  
 290. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 2 (N.D. 
Ill. June 25, 2018) (“Franchisees . . . are also responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of their respective restaurants and for . . . hiring.”). 
 291. See id. (explaining that McDonald’s franchisee hiring decisions were 
restricted by the no-hire provision).  
 292. See Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 786, 792 (S.D. 
Ill. 2018) (“[A]greements made among direct competitors . . . always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”).  
 293. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *5 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (“Even a person with a rudimentary understanding 
of economics would understand that if competitors agree not to hire each other’s 
employees, wages for employees will stagnate.”). 
 294. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 183 
(2010) (explaining how the relevant inquiry is one of operation, not form). 
 295. See id. at 199 (“The justification for cooperation is not relevant to 
whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.”). 
 296. See id. at 202–03 (stating that football teams needing to cooperate are 
not limited by antitrust law because “the special characteristics of this industry 
may provide a justification” for many kinds of agreements”). 
 297. See id. (noting that in some instances, the justification may warrant rule 
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Ninth Circuit’s previous conclusion in Williams v. I.B. Fischer 
Nevada, that franchises are single entities because they inherently 
require cooperation and uniformity.298 In the no-poach context, 
although franchisee or other entities’ cooperative efforts may be 
required in certain aspects to support a larger venture, the venture 
should not necessarily be summarily immunized.299 The question 
of the franchise should be evaluated in more detail when asserted 
as a defense.300  
III.  Element Two:  Analyzing the Restraint’s Reasonableness 
Under the Per Se, Quick-Look, or Extended Rule of Reason 
Standard 
The second element, an unreasonable restraint of trade, will 
be governed by one of three possible standards of review.301 These 
standards require different showings by the plaintiff.302 Per se 
review only requires that the plaintiff show the existence of a 
presumptively unlawful per se restraint.303 Quick-look or 
abbreviated rule of reason analysis requires that the plaintiff show 
the existence of an inherently anticompetitive restraint which one 
with only a rudimentary understanding of economics would infer 
                                                                                                     
of reason analysis but was “still concerted activity under the Sherman Act that is 
subject to § 1 analysis.”). 
 298. See Williams v. I.B. Fishcher Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev. 
1992) (“[T]he franchisor does everything in its power to minimize competition and 
promote uniformity between franchises.”). 
 299. See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 200 (“[I]ntrafirm agreements may 
simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action.”). 
 300. See id. at 202–03 (noting that in some instances, the justification may 
warrant rule of reason analysis but was “still concerted activity under the 
Sherman Act that is subject to § 1 analysis”).  
 301. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Courts have 
established three categories of analysis—per se, quick-look, and Rule of 
Reason . . . though the methods often blend together.”). 
 302. See id. (explaining the requirements of the different standards).  
 303. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (“Per se rules 
are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of 
anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of 
the challenged conduct.”). 
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to be anticompetitive.304 The quick-look standard specifically does 
not require that the plaintiff demonstrate the defendant’s market 
power.305 Finally, the extended rule of reason is the most onerous;  
it requires elaborate economic analysis, including demonstrating 
market power, in order to show anticompetitive effects.306 The no-
poach antitrust plaintiff has a good case for per se condemnation 
but should assert quick-look review in the alternative.307 An 
extended rule of reason case presents potential challenges, which 
may be difficult, but not impossible, for a plaintiff to surmount.308 
A.  The Agencies’ Position That No-Poach Agreements Warrant 
Per Se Treatment Is the Most Convincing Theory 
As described in Part I.C.1, the DOJ and FTC have 
convincingly outlined the theory that no-poach agreements are per 
se illegal market allocations.309 The settlement of every single 
“pure” horizontal no-poach case (between competitor universities, 
railway component companies, technology companies) 
demonstrates the strength of this argument.310 In cases involving 
vertically oriented firms, however, the plaintiff should anchor onto 
the agencies’ statements in the HR Guidelines, which note that a 
                                                                                                     
 304. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) 
(“While [this act] is not [per se illegal] price fixing as such, no elaborate industry 
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement.”). 
 305. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not 
justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when 
there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, “no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement.”  
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
 306. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“The rule of 
reason requires courts to conduct a fact-specific assessment of “market power and 
market structure . . . to assess the restraint’s actual effect” on competition.”). 
 307. See infra Parts III.A–B (describing the applicability of the per se rule and 
quick-look in the alternative). 
 308. See discussion infra Part III.C (describing a rule of reason analysis in the 
no-poach context). 
 309. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ and FTC’s application 
of antitrust law in the no-poach context). 
 310. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ’s no-poach actions). 
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firm’s downstream market position is inconsequential.311 
Additionally, the DOJ in a statement of interest in a franchise case 
has confirmed this analysis.312 Further, a recent decision in the 
Southern District of California found a per se illegal restraint 
when “unlike agreements made up and down a supply chain 
between buyers and sellers, Defendants [who] use their no-
poaching restraints . . . with virtually all other [medical service 
sub-contractors], thereby compromise[e] their [sub-contractors’] 
ability to compete freely to hire qualified travelers and sell 
medical-traveler services to hospitals.”313 The court focused not on 
the vertical element in the downstream markets but on the 
horizontal effect of the restraint on the relevant employment 
market.314  
In other words, an antitrust plaintiff’s argument should be 
that the relevant market for a no-poach agreement is the labor 
market.315 The restraint does not restrain competition for iPhones, 
for example, but for employees.316 And in the labor market, an 
electronic equipment producer can compete for the same 
                                                                                                     
 311. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective, 
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment 
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete 
to provide the same services.”). 
 312. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 20 (“Even though the typical no-poach 
agreement between a franchisor and one of its franchisees is vertical, it could be 
horizontal if it restrains competition between the two interrelated entities.”). 
 313. See Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare Inc., No. 17cv205-
MMA (MDD), 2018 WL 3032552, at *10 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (focusing on the 
horizontal aspects of the no-poach restraint). 
 314. See id. (noting that per se treatment applied given the pervasiveness of 
the vertical restraints and their horizontal effect on the labor market);  see also 
Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 
Nov. 13, 2018) (discussing vertical and horizontal elements in the agreements not 
to solicit or hire Cinnabon employees);  Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 
331 F. Supp. 786, 795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (recognizing vertical elements but stating 
that the “effects are felt strictly at the horizontal level”). 
 315. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“This case . . . is not about competition 
for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees, 
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos 
within a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”). 
 316. See id. (describing the relevant market). 
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employees that an electronic device manufacturer would.317 In 
other words, there are multiple markets that a firm participates 
in.318 It can operate in a certain downstream product market while 
also operating in supply-side markets, such as the labor market.319 
Its competitors in these markets may differ and these competitors 
may be partners in other markets.320 Ultimately, the labor market 
is the one that is relevant for no-poach agreements; a vertical 
relationship in another market does not change the fact that the 
firms are competitors in the labor market.321 If this argument is 
successful, the plaintiff can use the agencies’ theory to assert a per 
se illegal market allocation—even though it is between two entities 
who share a vertical element in other markets.322  
B.  The Plaintiff Should Argue for Quick-Look Analysis in the 
Alternative 
Under the quick-look standard, courts may condemn 
restraints which “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude . . . have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”323 An analysis 
of this framework reveals that no-poach agreements are a perfect 
example of restraints that should be condemned under a quick-look 
                                                                                                     
 317. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective, 
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment 
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete 
to provide the same services.”). 
 318. See United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152 
(D.D.C. 2016) (describing National Records Center, Inc. as a competitor in 
multiple markets).  
 319. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing the distinction between labor markets and product markets). 
 320. See id. (describing restraints on competition that may have an effect on 
the labor market but not the product market).  
 321.  See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective, 
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment 
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete 
to provide the same services.”). 
 322. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ and FTC’s application 
of antitrust law in the no-poach context). 
 323. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (noting the 
standard for quick-look analysis). 
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because they directly restrain price competition.324 As a result, a 
plaintiff should be able to meet the initial burden of proof without 
showing evidence of market power or other elaborate industry 
analysis.325 
In one of the Supreme Court’s first quick-look cases—National 
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States326—a group of 
competitors agreed not to discuss prices with their customers until 
they selected an engineer.327 Although the restraints were not per 
se illegal, the Court found that they completely banned competitive 
bidding, price comparisons, and “imposed[d] the Society’s view of 
the costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace.”328 
In other words, the restraint very closely resembled a variety of 
per se violations but did not quite fall into any of those 
categories.329 Rather than go to the extended rule of reason, the 
Court found that this was a facially anticompetitive restraint since 
price is the “central nervous system of the economy” and an 
agreement interfering with this competition is “illegal on its 
face.”330 It also held that “no elaborate industry analysis was 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of the 
agreement.”331 
                                                                                                     
 324. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 786, 792 
(S.D. Ill. 2018) (“[A]greements made among direct competitors . . . always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”). 
 325. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“Full rule of reason treatment is unnecessary where the 
anticompetitive effects are clear even in the absence of a detailed market 
analysis.”). 
 326. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978) 
(finding that a canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding was not justified 
under Rule of Reason). 
 327. See id. at 691 (describing the association’s agreement). 
 328. See id. at 694–95 (noting the restraint’s effect was to eliminate price 
competition). 
 329. See id. at 692 (“While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of 
such an agreement.”).  
 330. See id. at 692–93 (citing United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 
337 (1969)). 
 331. See id. (noting the abbreviated review due to the egregious nature of the 
alleged violation). 
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In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court again 
condemned restraints on a quick-look.332 In this decision, the Court 
found that the effects of the NCAA’s scheme to control teams’ 
television rights were apparent;  NCAA teams lost their freedom 
to compete, the restraints increased price while lowering output, 
and most importantly—the restraints caused price and output to 
become unresponsive to customer preference.333 The defendant did 
not try to rebut these findings, in effect admitting that the 
restraints were naked.334 Instead, the defendant stated that the 
NCAA lacked the market power necessary to affect supply and 
demand in the market.335 The Supreme Court rejected “this 
argument for two reasons, one legal, one factual.”336 It found that 
as a matter of law, that the “absence of proof of market power does 
not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”337 The restraint 
was inconsistent with the “Sherman Act’s command that price and 
supply be responsive to consumer preference. We have never 
required proof of market power in such a case.”338 In addition to 
this, the Court found that as a factual matter, the NCAA did 
possess market power.339 
In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Supreme Court 
once again rejected the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that the 
plaintiff define the dentists’ market power.340 The Court again 
                                                                                                     
 332. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Because it 
restrains price and output, the NCAA's television plan has a significant potential 
for anticompetitive effects.”). 
 333. See id. (“A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of 
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with [the] 
fundamental goal of antitrust law.”). 
 334. See id. at 109 (“Petitioner does not quarrel with the District Court’s 
finding that price and output are not responsive to demand.”).  
 335. See id. (“Petitioner argues, however, that its television plan can have no 
significant anticompetitive effect since the record indicates that it has no market 
power—no ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the market.”). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See id. (arguing that the NCAA did did possess market power in a 
narrower market for football broadcasting). 
 340. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (“[E]ven if the 
restriction imposed by the Federation is not sufficiently “naked” to call this 
principle into play, the Commission’s failure to engage in detailed market 
analysis is not fatal to its finding of a violation of the Rule of Reason.”). 
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concluded that this step was unnecessary because an agreement to 
restrict insurers’ access to patients’ x-rays was a direct restraint 
on output.341 The restraint impeded the natural flow of the market 
and impaired “the ability of the market to . . . ensure the provision 
of desired good and services to consumers at a price approximating 
the marginal cost of providing them.”342 In the absence of a 
pro-competitive justification, the Court condemned them as naked 
restrictions.343 
Quick-look analysis is inappropriate where the plaintiff fails 
to show that anticompetitive effects are obvious or 
“rudimentary.”344 For example, it was unclear to the Supreme 
Court in California Dental whether restraints on deceptive 
advertising would harm competition or increase consumer 
confidence—thereby creating a greater demand for dental 
services.345 It was similarly unclear to lower courts whether 
banning independent team websites had redeeming value to the 
NHL, whether a racing association restrained competition by 
forbidding the use of a certain transmission, or whether the 
agreement to install x-ray machines limiting the size of bags 
created anticompetitive effects.346 
No-poach agreements are not subject to the same defects;  the 
effect of a no-poach restraint is clear.347 Under the Engineers 
                                                                                                     
 341. See id. (finding that the defendant’s restraints were naked restraints on 
trade). 
 342. See id. at 459 (describing the economic effects of the restraint). 
 343. See id. (“[T]he evidence did not support a finding that the careful use of 
x rays as a basis for evaluating insurance claims is in fact destructive of proper 
standards of dental care.”). 
 344. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013) (refusing to apply a 
quick-look approach because an observer with a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could not conclude that the arrangements in question were 
anticompetitive).  
 345. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (“The case before us, 
however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of anticompetitive 
effects is comparably obvious.”). 
 346. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 270 F. App’x 
56, 59 (2d Cir. 2008);  Cont’l Airlines v. United Airlines, 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th 
Cir. 2002);  Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 853–54 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 347. See, e.g., Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, 
at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (“Even a person with a rudimentary 
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standard, where price is the central nervous system of the economy 
and agreements interfering with price competition are illegal, 
no-poach restraints should be condemned.348 These agreements 
prevent employees from obtaining pricing information necessary 
to ascertain the competitive value of their labor.349 Additionally, as 
in Board of Regents and Federation of Dentists, no-poach 
agreements disrupt the natural flow of the free market so that 
price (wages) and output (productivity) are not responsive to 
employer demand;  both are artificially depressed.350 There does 
not appear to be any efficiency benefit from franchise no-poaching 
agreements in the relevant labor market.351 
In its statements of interest in franchise no-poach cases, the 
Department of Justice appears reluctant to extend the quick-look 
given the vertical elements involved.352 It first states, without 
citing a source, that “quick-look analysis does not apply to a 
vertical agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee.”353 
However, the Supreme Court’s quintessential quick-look cases 
outline cases in which participating member teams agreed to 
restraints imposed by the NCAA or when professionals agreed to 
                                                                                                     
understanding of economics would understand that if competitors agree not to 
hire each other’s employees, wages for employees will stagnate.”). 
 348. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) 
(“[A]n agreement that ‘interferes with the setting of price by free market forces’ 
is illegal on its face.”). 
 349. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *5 (explaining how no-hire provisions 
deflate wages).  
 350. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (2009) (stating that 
disrupting the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market 
should be condemned).  
 351. See Interview by GCR USA with Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, (Dec. 13, 2018) (“The FTC doesn’t see what the benefits of a non-compete 
agreement are when there is no highly skilled labour involved . . . There doesn’t 
seem to be any efficiency benefit, so outlawing that would seem not to have a cost 
to it; actually it might have a benefit.”). 
 352. Compare Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 16 
(stating that a per se rule was inapplicable in the case of McDonald’s having no-
hire provisions with franchisees), with HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From 
an antitrust perspective, firms that compete to hire or retain employees are 
competitors in the employment marketplace, regardless of whether the firms 
make the same products or compete to provide the same services.”). 
 353. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 22 (stating that quick-look is generally 
inapplicable to vertical franchise agreements). 
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restraints that were formalized by a professional trade 
organization.354  
 The agency then quickly shifts its analysis, stating that when 
no-poach restraints are ancillary to the franchise system, then “by 
definition, quick-look analysis is not appropriate.”355 However, this 
only holds true where an pro-competitive argument is accepted.356 
For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court recognized 
that the NCAA’s rules play “a vital role in enabling college football 
to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be 
marketed . . . and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.”357 This 
did not stop the Supreme Court from condemning the restraints 
under a quick-look because the restraints were not necessary to 
further these pro-competitive goals.358 
Essentially, the agency seems to be asserting that the vertical 
nature of the franchise relationship inherently creates doubt that 
the restraint can be readily condemned as anticompetitive.359 But 
the DOJ’s concern with vertical efficiencies is, again, more 
appropriately placed at the stage that the defendant asserts a 
pro-competitive justification.360 However, this Note makes note 
that it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to properly assert 
                                                                                                     
 354. See supra notes 326–343 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on quick-look analysis). 
 355. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 22 (“The ‘quick-look analysis’ applies only 
in rare cases ‘when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be 
ascertained,’ and it is ‘implausible’ that procompetitive benefits would outweigh 
harm to competition.”). 
 356. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (condemning 
the restraint because it “cannot be said that "the agreement on price is necessary 
to market the product at all"). 
 357. Id. at 102. 
 358. See id. at 106–07 (“The anticompetitive consequences of this 
arrangement are apparent. Individual competitors lose their freedom to compete. 
Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are 
unresponsive to consumer preference.”). 
 359. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 12 (“Accordingly, because vertical 
territorial allocation agreements may have both procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects, courts evaluate their legality using the rule of reason’s 
balancing approach.”). 
 360. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“If the plaintiff 
carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a 
procompetitive rational for the restraint.”). 
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a pro-competitive justification under the ancillary restraints 
doctrine.361 As a result, at the least, quick-look treatment will 
likely apply.362 
C.  As a Last Resort, Plaintiff Can Make a Claim Under the Rule 
of Reason 
Plaintiffs should try to avoid an extended rule of reason 
analysis because of the likely difficulties of proving market 
power.363 However, plaintiffs can still attempt to meet their initial 
burden under the extended rule of reason by: (1) showing an 
adverse effect on competition by direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects or (2) by showing circumstantial evidence of the defendants’ 
market power.364  
Under the second method, when the defendant has a dominant 
share of the market or entry or expansion barriers exist, the court 
may infer adverse effects on competition.365 Although market 
power is defined as the power to foreclose competitors or raise 
prices and can be evidenced by many qualitative factors, courts 
tend to look heavily at market share.366 Concern tends to arise 
                                                                                                     
 361. See discussion infra Part IV (noting the strict requirements in asserting 
a procompetitive justification). 
 362. See supra notes 326–343 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on quick-look analysis). 
 363. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (stating that it would be difficult 
for a plaintiff challenging a vertical agreement between a franchisor and 
franchisee to find sufficient market power). 
 364. See id. at 2285–84  
The plaintiffs can make this showing directly or indirectly. Direct 
evidence of anticompetitive effects would be “proof of actual 
detrimental effects [on competition],” such as reduced output, 
increased prices, or decreased quality . . . . Indirect evidence would be 
proof of market power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint 
harms competition. 
(citations omitted). 
 365. See id. (explaining that adverse effects can be implied by market power). 
 366. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984) 
(indicating that a firm must have at least a 30% market share to infer market 
power);  see also Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 104 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating the Supreme “Court has concluded that as a matter of 
law a defendant with 30% or less of the relevant market lacked market power for 
an antitrust violation”). 
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when the defendants’ market share is around thirty to thirty-five 
percent.367 The focus on market share is so strong that some courts 
may initially require a showing of market power, however, to 
dispose of cases without merit.368 
1.  Showing Direct Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects 
However, the first method of showing direct evidence of 
effects, or “proof of actual detrimental effects such as a reduction 
of output,” obviates the need for an inquiry into market power.369 
The Supreme Court noted direct evidence of anticompetitive effects 
where insurers were unable to obtain X-rays in locations 
dominated by the Federation.370 The evidence of “sustained 
adverse effects on competition in those areas where IFD dentists 
predominated, viewed in light of the reality that markets for dental 
services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to 
support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable 
even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”371 
Proof of actual harm “can obviate the need for an inquiry into 
market power,” since the entire purpose of deducing market power 
is to determine the potential for anticompetitive effects.372 In the 
no-poach context, evidence of actual anticompetitive effect could 
                                                                                                     
 367. See Drug Emporium, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (stating market power 
benchmarks). 
 368. See, e.g., In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (stating that “by definition, without [market power] a firm or group of 
firms can’t harm competition”). 
 369. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (2000) (“[T]he finding 
of actual, sustained adverse effects on competition . . . viewed in light of the 
reality that markets for dental services tend to be relatively localized, is legally 
sufficient to support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable 
even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”);  see also United States v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that there was sufficient 
evidence of anticompetitive harm based on reduced card output, fewer card 
features, decreased network services, and stunting of price and innovation). 
 370. See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (stating that actual effects of 
competitive harm were apparent). 
 371. See id. (stating that that the inquiry into market power is but a 
“surrogate for detrimental effects”).  
 372. See id. (describing the essential purpose of the market power analysis). 
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include:  decreases or increases in salaries across industries, 
whether employees who leave suffer pay cuts when switching to 
other industries or roles, and whether it takes longer for displaced 
employees to find work in another field.373 If the plaintiff is able to 
demonstrate this type of evidence, rule of reason analysis may be 
much less burdensome.374 
2.  Showing Circumstantial Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects 
In the event that direct evidence of harm is absent or the court 
first requires a market power inquiry, the plaintiff must turn to 
circumstantial evidence based on market share as demonstrated 
by qualitative factors and other economic analyses.375 The first 
step is to define the relevant market.376 This allows the court to 
identify significant competitors who would be able to constrain the 
defendant’s monopsony power.377 At this point, relative market 
shares can then be computed.378 This process has to be performed 
                                                                                                     
 373. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202–04 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing 
potential direct evidence of anticompetitive effect). 
 374. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating 
that a plaintiff can satisfy their burden under the Rule of Reason by proving the 
existence of actual anticompetitive effects, “such as reduction of output . . . 
increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods or services”).  
 375. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 n. 42 (1984) (“While 
the reasonableness' of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market 
power of the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the 
means by which the effects of the conduct on the market place can be assessed, 
market power is only one test of 'reasonableness.”).  
 376. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 
(1953) (outlining the steps in relevant market definition);  see also United States 
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) (same). 
 377. See, e.g., Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“Determining the limits of a relevant . . . market requires identifying the 
choices available to consumers.”);  Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The goal in defining the relevant market 
is to identify the market participants and competitive pressures that restrain an 
individual firm’s ability to raise prices or restrict output.”);  Doctor’s Hosp. v. Se. 
Med. Alliance, 123 F.3d 301, 311 (5th Cir. 1997) (“To define a market is to identify 
producers that provide customers of a defendant firm (or firms) with alternative 
sources for the defendant’s products or services.”). 
 378. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co., 345 U.S. at 612 (evaluating the 
percentages of market share among competitors). 
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twice—for the relevant supply (rather than product) market and 
the geographic market.379 
The objective, in a monopsony labor market, is to draw a 
boundary between buyers of labor who are competing with one 
another for employees and those that are not competing for the 
same pool of labor.380 The focal point is the interchangeability of 
the firms in the eyes of employees;  in other words, to identify the 
employers who are reasonable substitutes for employment. 381 The 
inquiry asks whether “from the perspective of an . . . employee, a 
job opportunity in the oil industry [is interchangeable] with, for 
example, one in the pharmaceutical industry.”382 The focus is on 
whether an employer is interchangeable, whether it can serve as a 
substitute for a competitor’s fleeing employees if that competitor 
exercises its market power by lowering wages.383 
It is in the plaintiff’s best interest to define the relevant 
markets as narrowly as possible since a defendant’s market share 
in a smaller market will be larger than in a broader one.384 This 
will likely come down to how specialized the employees are (in 
addition to how far employees would travel for other potential 
employment).385 This is because it is “consistent with common 
                                                                                                     
 379. See Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 613 (describing the relevant product 
analysis and geographic market definition). 
 380. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that “in such a case, ‘the market is not the market of competing sellers 
but of competing buyers. This market is comprised of buyers who are seen by 
sellers as being reasonably good substitutes.’”);  see also Campfield v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 381. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 202 (“This market is comprised of buyers 
who are seen by sellers as being reasonably good substitutes.”). 
 382. See id. (“Plaintiff is right to urge that ‘the proper focus is . . . the 
commonality and interchangeability of the buyers, not the commonality or 
interchangeability of the sellers.”). 
 383. See id. (“Where market power is exercised by buyers, it is the elasticity 
of the sellers' supply that is at issue.”). 
 384. See FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[M]arket 
definition is guided by the ‘narrowest market principle’ . . . The circle must be 
drawn narrowly to exclude any other product . . . .”).  
 385. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 203 (citing Bruce C. Fallick, A Review of the 
Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 
12 (1996) (“Less technical jobs tend to involve skills that are not as industry-
specific, creating greater cross-elasticity for these employees.”)). 
438 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 381 (2019) 
sense and empirical research that employees’ industry-specific 
experience may cause them to suffer a pay cut if forced to switch 
industries.”386 These questions tend to make certain positions less 
substitutable than others and makes the market narrower 
(inflating the market share of the firms in this smaller market).387 
In the same way, specialization may decrease the size of the 
relevant geographic market.388 Employees may be less willing to 
substitute to other regions where their industry or role is not as 
well represented.389 This would also shrink the relevant geographic 
market.390 
By contrast, less technical jobs (such as those held by 
non-managerial franchise employees) “tend to involve skills that 
are not as industry-specific, creating greater cross elasticity for 
these employees” in other roles.391 This conclusion that specialized 
professionals (such as engineers, technology specialists, and 
therapists) constitute smaller relevant markets seems to square 
with the cases brought by the antitrust enforcement agencies.392 
                                                                                                     
 386. See id. (citing Elisabetta Magnani, Risk of Labor Displacement and 
Cross-Industry Labor Mobility, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 593, 593–94 (2001) 
(referring to the empirical research indicating that wage losses generally 
accompany industry mobility)). 
 387. See supra text accompanying note 384 (describing how defining the 
relevant market impacts the computation of market shares);  see also infra text 
accompanying note 391 (describing the effect of specialized roles on the cross-
elasticity of demand for these roles. 
 388. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Additionally, we have said, ‘the relevant geographic market is the area in which 
a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services he or she seek.’” 
(quoting Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n, 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984))). 
 389. See id. (stating that geographic markets must conform to commercial 
realities).  
 390. See FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2015) (outlining 
the defendant’s arguments that the relevant market should have been larger and 
included more firms). 
 391. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Bruce 
C. Fallick, A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers, 50 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 12 (1996) (noting the impact of employee specialization 
on the labor market)). 
 392. See Complaint, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC., No. 1710134 (FTC July 
31, 2018) (concerning the employment of therapy professionals);  Stipulation and 
Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747 
(D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (concerning the employment of engineers and other highly 
specialized rail component positions);  In re High-Tech Empl. Antitrust Litig., 856 
F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2012) (concerning the employment of 
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By contrast, non-managerial restaurant franchise employees may 
be able to switch to roles in retail franchises, supermarkets, or 
various other types of roles.393 In addition to the relevant labor 
market, the geographic region may be more expansive where the 
industry is less specialized.394 
The courts will first consider qualitative characteristics of the 
market in order to define the substitutability of certain roles in 
various geographic regions.395 One qualitative factor is whether 
the industry views the defendant as a competitor in the proposed 
market (and whether the defendant views itself that way).396 
Customers’ views on the interchangeability of demand may also be 
probative.397 In the Second Circuit’s Todd v. Exxon decision, the 
plaintiff contended that “the defendants’ own conduct and 
apparent perceptions support the alleged product market.”398 
                                                                                                     
technology professionals). 
 393. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 202–03 (“The district court found that 
"plaintiff fails to adequately explain why an antitrust lawyer employed by an oil 
company does not compete in the same market as an antitrust lawyer at a 
commercial bank or in a private law firm.”). 
 394. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 
441 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The relevant geographic market inquiry focuses on that 
geographic area within which the defendant’s customers who are affected by the 
challenged practice can predictably turn to alternative suppliers if the defendant 
were to raise prices or restrict its output.”). 
 395. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (listing 
several practical indicia to discern interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity 
of demand). 
 396. See United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453–55 (1964) (relying 
on the fact that can and bottle makers compare prices);  United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting middleware products in 
relevant market for search engines/OS since Microsoft viewed it as only a 
potential threat);  United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121, 
1160–61 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting proposed market since the term “high 
function” software lacked meaning in the industry). 
 397. See, e.g., FTC v. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that two drugs were not interchangeable since prescribers did not switch between 
the two);  Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, 626 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that consumer preference was not adequately accounted for in defining 
the relevant product market);  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 
199 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering consumer preference for different types of floor 
coverings to suit certain room);  R.D. Imps. Ryno Indus. v. Mazda Distribs., 807 
F.2d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the market included foreign and 
domestic cars that consumers chose as substitutes). 
 398. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 205 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the 
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Notably, the defendant relied on salary information within the 
petrochemical industry to execute the restraint;  the plaintiff 
asserted that their reliance on this industry specific data indicated 
the relevant market.399 The Second Circuit noted that this 
argument was dismissed too hastily by the District Court since 
“industry recognition is well-established as a factor that courts 
consider in defining a market . . . [and that] economic actors 
usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities.”400 As a 
result, the defendant’s own data and conclusions about its 
competitive standpoint in the labor market can be very useful in 
assessing the relevant market. 
One other factor that tends to indicate a defendant’s market 
power is that labor markets are inherently inelastic (unresponsive 
to changes in price).401 This creates a situation where employers 
may possess more power than their market share indicates since 
employees cannot easily respond to wage decreases. For example, 
“supply could be elastic if . . . [employees] have the option of 
withholding some output from the market in hopes of higher prices 
in future years.”402 However, labor is “an extremely perishable 
commodity—an hour not worked today can never be recovered.”403 
As a result, “collusion among employers can drive the wage down 
to the individual’s reservation wage” since employees cannot easily 
substitute or “switch” to alternative employment to mitigated the 
hours they lose.404 The supply of labor, as a result, will not respond 
as quickly to changes in wages and this constitutes a strong 
structural indicator of the defendant’s inflated market power.405 
                                                                                                     
defendant’s conduct with respect to defining the relevant market). 
 399. See id. at 204 (“In other words, the very fact that defendants rely on data 
regarding MPT salaries in the oil and petrochemical industry suggests that this 
is the relevant market.”). 
 400. See id. at 205 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 
(1962);  Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 219 n.4 
(D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 401. See id. at 211 (“[T]he supply of labor has an inherently inelastic quality.”) 
 402. Id. at 201 (citing Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy 
and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 313 (1991)). 
 403. See id. (describing the inelasticity of demand impacting labor markets). 
 404. See id. at 211 (explaining the effects of collusion on employees).  
 405. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 7.2 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES] (“The prospect of harm 
depends on the collective market power, in the relevant market, of firms whose 
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While qualitative indicators of market power may defend 
against a 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal, at trial, a plaintiff would 
also have to show economic evidence of the cross-elasticity of 
supply for employees and the geographic regions in which they 
operate.406 The primary economic test for this purpose is the 
hypothetical monopolist test.407 This method—employed by the 
FTC, Antitrust Division, and the vast majority of courts—asks 
whether a “hypothetical monopolist” is likely to impose a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP).408 If the 
hypothetical monopolist could sustain a price increase at this level, 
the product market and geographic area indicated by the firm or 
firms is the relevant market.409 
A plaintiff should note that this test does not examine every 
reasonable substitute but only those that constrain the dominant 
firm from raising prices.410 As a result, the plaintiff should 
distinguish potential substitutes that would not adequately 
constrain the defendant’s market power. In line with this concept, 
the “smallest market principle” will also help a plaintiff narrowly 
                                                                                                     
incentives to compete are substantially weakened by coordinated conduct. This 
collective market power is greater, the lower is the market elasticity of demand.”). 
 406. See, e.g., Flovac v. Airvac, 84 F. Supp. 3d 95, 102 (D.P.R. 2015), aff’d, 817 
F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[A]n antritrust plaintiff facing a properly configured 
summary-judgment motion, . . . must still marshal competent ‘adequate evidence 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact.’ And because defining the relevant 
market is, at bottom, a ‘key economic question,’ it stands to reason that [plaintiff] 
introduce some type of economic evidence . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 407. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 277–78 (6th Cir. 
2014) (noting the mechanics of the SSNIP in geographic market definition);  
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.2 (stating that the mechanics of the 
hypothetical monopolist test are the same for product market and geographic 
market definition). 
 408. See In re Se. Milk, 739 F.3d at 277–78 (describing the SSNIP test or 
hypothetical monopolist inquiry). 
 409. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.1.1 (“Specifically, the 
test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price 
regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products 
(‘hypothetical monopolist’) likely would impose at least a small but significant and 
non-transitory increase in price . . . .”). 
 410. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.1.1 (“Market shares of 
different products in narrowly defined markets are more likely to capture the 
relative competitive significance of these products, and often more accurately 
reflect competition between close substitutes.”);  see also United States v. H&R 
Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).  
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define the relevant market.411 If one were to draw a circle around 
a firm, applying the test and extending the circle to the next 
potential substitute firms until the hypothetical monopolist could 
raise prices, this point would demarcate the bounds of the relevant 
markets—even though other larger supply and geographic 
markets may also exist.412 This principle helps define a market 
that is neither too narrow nor too broad, where interchangeability 
becomes more speculative.413 
IV.  Defending Against an Ancillary Pro-Competitive Justification 
If a plaintiff shows an agreement and an unreasonable 
restraint of trade under one of the three standards of review, the 
defendant can assert that the restraint was ancillary to a larger 
pro-competitive goal.414 Luckily, if a plaintiff can meet the initial 
burden, it is likely that the defendant will not be able to 
successfully assert a pro-competitive justification.415  
First, what is an ancillary restraint? Judge Taft first 
introduced the concepts of naked and ancillary restraints in United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.416 He rejected a bid-rigging 
scheme, stating that “no conventional restraint of trade can be 
enforced unless . . . it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a 
                                                                                                     
 411. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(“[M]arket definition is guided by the ‘narrowest market’ principle. . . . The circle 
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable 
variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn”). 
 412. See id. (describing the smallest market principle). 
 413. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.2 (“[H]ypothetical 
monopolist test ensures that markets are not defined too narrowly, but it does not 
lead to a single relevant market.”). 
 414. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 337 
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the rule of reason 
applies to ancillary restraints—those that a part of a larger endeavor and are 
necessary for it to reach its “efficiency-enhancing benefits”);  see also Stop & Shop 
Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 5, 63 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“[R]estraints that are truly ancillary to a larger efficiency-gaining enterprise . . . 
are not normally condemned per se without looking at likely consequences.”). 
 415. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing the outer bounds of the ancillary 
restraints doctrine). 
 416. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 
1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (articulating the ancillary restraints doctrine for 
the first time). 
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lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full 
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract . . . .”417 First, 
Judge Taft found that where the aim of the restraint is merely to 
restrain competition, it is naked and “there [is] nothing to justify 
or excuse the restraint.”418 He then qualified the ancillary 
restraints doctrine by stating than an ancillary restraint must be 
“commensurate with the reasonable protection of the covenantee 
in respect to the main transactions affected by the contract.”419 
Finally, Judge Taft famously warned that “[t]here are some cases 
in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive, the proper limits of 
the relaxation of the rules . . . have set sail on a sea of doubt . . . in 
respect to contracts which have no other purpose . . . [other] than 
the mutual restraint of the parties.”420 No-poach agreements 
usually fall within this category.421 Outside of a limited few cases, 
if a no-poach plaintiff can meet his burden under either the per se, 
quick-look, or extended rule of reason standard, it is unlikely that 
a defendant will be able to successfully assert a pro-competitive 
justification in response.422  
A.  First, Collaboration or Integration Is Required 
A careful analysis of the ancillary restraints doctrine supports 
the conclusion that no-poach agreements are often not intended to 
promote any collaborative effort designed to bring pro-competitive 
benefits to consumers. To distinguish an ancillary restraint from a 
naked restraint, the first step is to determine if the restraint is 
                                                                                                     
 417. See id. (noting that without the ancillary restraints doctrine, nearly 
every contract would be an illegal restraint of trade). 
 418. See id. (using the term ‘naked’ to describe restraints of trade with no 
conceivable pro-competitive aim). 
 419. See id. (limiting the reach of the ancillary restraints doctrine to those 
restraints that are necessary to perpetuate the contract or collaboration). 
 420. See id. at 284 (hinting that to the extent an ancillary restraint’s benefits 
are unclear, courts should not speculate and extend this doctrine beyond its 
appropriate reach). 
 421. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing how no-poach restraints are likely to 
fail under the ancillary restraints doctrine). 
 422. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing the outer bounds of the ancillary 
restraints doctrine). 
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made with respect to a larger venture or collaboration.423 In Polk 
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,424 Judge Easterbrook 
declared that “cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is 
necessary for people to cooperate in some respects before they may 
compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient 
production.”425 By contrast, naked restraints are agreements that 
do not promote collaboration at the time they are adopted.426 
Easterbrook illustrated this principle, stating that, “[i]f two 
people meet one day and decide not to compete, the 
restraint . . . does nothing but suppress competition. If A hires B 
as a salesman and passes customer lists to B, then B’s reciprocal 
covenant not to compete with A is ancillary” to a pro-competitive 
venture.427 The collaboration in Polk Bros fell into the latter 
category;  two businesses entered a lease agreement for a shared 
building and agreed to divide between them the types of products 
they would sell.428 This restraint was an agreement that allowed 
the firms to collaborate safely;  it limited free-riding where one 
company could spend large amounts of money on advertising—only 
to be undercut by its neighbor at the last second.429 It allowed the 
companies to complement each other’s products and created a new 
offering to the public.430 
                                                                                                     
 423. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (analyzing 
the steps with respect to raising a pro-competitive efficiency argument);  see, e.g., 
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2013) (“When 
‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available to all,’ per 
se rules of illegality are appropriate, and instead the restraint must be judged 
according to the flexible Rule of Reason.”);  Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News 
Co., 269 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is commonly understood today that per 
se condemnation is limited to ‘naked’ . . . agreements, that is, those that are not 
part of a larger pro-competitive joint venture.”). 
 424. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
  
 425. Id. at 188 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984)). 
 426. See id. at 189 (explaining that the restraint’s benefits are judged by the 
time they are entered). 
 427. See id. (describing the ancillary restraints doctrine and when it applies). 
 428. See id. at 187–88 (describing the venture). 
 429. See id. at 190 (“[T]he control of free riding is a legitimate objective of a 
system of distribution.”). 
 430. See id. (“Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for 
people to cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and 
cooperation facilitates efficient production.”). 
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Similarly, in Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System,431 the Supreme Court found that the collaboration 
between thousands of authors and composers to grant licenses for 
a blanket fee was not a naked restraint.432 It “accompanied the 
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement,” to offer benefits 
to buyers and sellers of the music.433 In NCAA v. Board of Regents 
of University of Oklahoma,434 the Supreme Court also found that 
the NCAA’s broadcast provisions may be necessary to coordinate 
its member teams “if the product is to be available at all” to the 
public.435 In all of these cases, the restraint was intended to 
facilitate larger collaborations between competing entities.  
By contrast, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,436 
the Supreme Court found that a cartel was not a pro-competitive 
venture since there was no integration and its sole purpose was to 
eliminate a competitor.437 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society,438 the Court also found that a price-fixing agreement was 
a naked restraint in the absence of any meaningful integration 
between network doctors.439 The joint network of doctors was 
simply a grouping of independent competitors, it did not promise 
any new, integrated service options, and it only resulted in the 
manipulation of prices for medical care.440 A similar case in the 
Seventh Circuit met similar results;  in General Leaseways, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                     
 431. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  
 432. See id. at 7 (remanding for analysis under the rule of reason rather than 
condemning the restraint as per se unlawful). 
 433. See id. at 2 (stating its rationale for rule of reason treatment). 
 434. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
 435. See id. at 100 (applying the quick-look or abbreviated rule of reason 
standard of review). 
 436. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), 
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).  
 437. See id. at 596 (accepting the lower court’s findings that the purpose of 
the restraint was to protect each other’s markets and eliminate other 
competition). 
 438. Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 439. See id. at 355 (stating that the pricing lists coordinated by the medical 
society were per se unlawful violations instituted by competitors). 
 440. See id. (“[T]he foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other 
joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool 
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunity for profit . . . .”). 
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National Truck Leasing Ass’n,441 Judge Posner stated that a 
trucking association was not integrated with the purpose of 
creating any new functionality and “sells nothing.”442 Finally, in 
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.,443 the Supreme Court found that 
agreements to divide the bar preparation market were per se 
violations.444 No other cooperation between the firms occurred, 
they were simply competitors dividing market territories.445 
Additional Seventh Circuit decisions further support the idea that 
productive output and integrative efforts are required.446 Other 
jurisdictions concur in this analysis as well.447 
One of the only plausible integrations exists when two firms 
engage in a joint venture where the no-poach restraint is designed 
to prevent employee raiding during the collaboration or to protect 
intellectual property that certain employees may possess.448 
                                                                                                     
 441. General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
 442. See id. at 595 (“The per se rule would collapse if every claim of economies 
from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a 
horizontal agreement not to compete from the per se rule to the rule of reason 
category.”). 
 443. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
 444. See id. at 50 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 
608 (1972) (“The defendants in Topco had never competed in the same market, 
but had simply agreed to allocate markets.”)). 
 445. See id. (“Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the 
parties split a market within which both do business or whether they merely 
reserve one market for one and another for the other.”). 
 446. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
attorneys’ agreements not to advertise in certain territories were naked market 
divisions because they were unrelated to the dissolution of their partnership or 
any collaborative purpose);  Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 
65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the clinic failed to allege that the 
restraint was related to their Free Flow collaboration and that, therefore, the 
restraint could not be ancillary). 
 447. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290, 326 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating 
that Apple’s per se illegal price fixing agreements with publishers were not 
necessary to implement the iBookstore);  Engine Specialties v. Bombardier, 605 
F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1979) (“[T]he fact that the alleged territorial restrictions were 
facially connected to a joint venture cannot immunize it from the reach of the 
antitrust laws.”);  New York ex rel. Spitzer v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 Supp. 2d 399 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[C]laims of improved quality of service do not shield price-fixing 
and market allocation activities from per se treatment.” (quoting Arizona v. 
Maricopa Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982)));  United States v. Dynalectric Co., 
859 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 448. See AYA Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 2018 WL 
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Additionally, no-poach agreements may protect the value of an 
investment, such as the purchase of a business and its assets.449 
Finally, and only with respect to asserting an integration between 
firms, no-poach agreements may be ancillary to a greater 
integration between entities in a franchise system or other 
vertically related entities.450 Beyond these collaborations, it is 
difficult to conceive of a situation in which no-poach agreements 
may facilitate an integration between firms. However, all three of 
these potential justifications should fail in a no-poach case for 
being either unnecessary to achieve the venture’s goal,451 or for 
failing to promote pro-competitive efficiencies.452 
B.  Ancillary Restraints Must Be Commensurate with the Main 
Transaction and Cannot Be Overly Broad 
If the restraint facilitates a transaction, the restraint must be 
commensurate or necessary to promote the main transactions 
affected by the contract.453 This concept applies to non-compete 
                                                                                                     
3032552, at *10–12, *15 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (finding that defendants were 
plausibly engaged in a joint venture). 
 449. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143–45 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding 
that a no-poach restriction conditioned on the sale of a business was an ancillary 
transaction). 
 450. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at *2, *7 
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (weighing whether a no-poach restraint was ancillary to 
the McDonald’s collaborative franchise venture).  
 451. See infra Part IV.B (stating that ancillary restraints must be necessary 
to achieve the pro-competitive goals intended by the collaboration).  
 452. See infra Part IV.C (noting that only certain types of pro-competitive 
justification arguments are recognized in antitrust law). 
 453. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (noting the 
limits to the ancillary restraints doctrine). See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 
F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2001)  
The question in every case involving a covenant not to compete 
ancillary to the sale of a business is whether the restraint is reasonably 
calculated to protect the legitimate interests of the purchaser in what 
he has purchased, or whether it goes so far beyond what is necessary 
as to provide a basis for the inference that its real purpose is the 
fostering of monopoly. 
Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machs., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“Covenants not to compete are valid if (1) ancillary to the main business purpose 
of a lawful contract, and (2) necessary to protect the covenantee's legitimate 
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restraints particularly well and these restraints are comparable to 
no-poach agreements in this respect.454 In deciding whether to 
uphold this type of restraint, courts usually examine the 
                                                                                                     
property interests, which require that the covenants be as limited as is reasonable 
to protect the covenantee's interests.”);  LDDS Commc’ns v. Automated 
Commc’ns, 35 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1994) 
The district court read the two covenants as exacting a nationwide 
cease fire although they were part of a sale of assets in Arizona and 
New Mexico . . . We resolve their ambiguity in favor of the lesser 
restraint and are persuaded that these two covenants not to compete 
are not fairly read to reach beyond Arizona and New Mexico.  
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A] non-
competition covenant ‘is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the 
protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and 
is not injurious to the public.’” (quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 
547 (1975))).  
 454. See, e.g., Global Telesystems v. IPNQwest, N.V., 151 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a temporary restraining order prohibiting the 
defendant from employing professional services of the defendant’s former 
employee because there was a plain no-solicit and no-hire clause in an agreement 
between the parties and the hiring would result in hardship to the plaintiff);  
Automated Concepts Inc. v. Weaver, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11560,  at *11–12 
(N.D. Ill. 2000)  
Unlike a covenant not to compete, which has the potential of 
threatening a person’s livelihood, a covenant not to solicit employees 
merely prohibits a person from pirating employees of the former 
employer and inducing them to work for another entity . . . Thus, the 
Court finds that an employer’s interest in preventing a current or 
former employee from raiding its employee rosters is reasonable. 
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reasonableness of the restraint with respect to duration,455 
territory,456 and type of product or service.457 
The Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have 
also condemned other types of restraints by these same metrics.458 
In Blackburn v. Sweeney,459 the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
                                                                                                     
 455. See, e.g., Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“[C]ovenants not to compete which are unlimited as to space or time are invalid 
and unenforceable.”);  Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(stating that a covenant not to compete does not violate the Sherman Act when 
reasonably limited in time and territory);  Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical 
Marine Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 1959) (affirming lower court’s 
finding that a restrictive covenant prohibiting the purchase of a vessel was 
reasonable in time, territory, and extent);  Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(finding that the covenant was reasonable under the meaning of the Sherman Act 
because the covenant was “ancillary to the main purpose of the contract . . . 
sufficiently limited in scope and time . . . Plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate 
[defendant] had monopolistic powers”);  Alders v. AFA Corp., 353 F. Supp. 654, 
656 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d mem., 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[I]t has been 
recognized that the validity of covenants not to compete turns upon the 
reasonableness of the restraint in each case.”). 
 456. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Endo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 267 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(“[M]ost modern courts will uphold a covenant to the extent that a breach of the 
covenant has occurred within a reasonable geographic area and time period, and, 
where applicable, with respect to a product reasonably related to the legitimate 
purpose of the restraint.”);  Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. El-Tan, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20550, at *10 (N.D. Okla. May 1, 1995) (finding that a covenant restricting 
the operation of a pizza business after termination of the contract within a 10-
mile radius was reasonable);  Verson Wilkins, Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 723 F. 
Supp. 1, 12013 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that territorial limits were unreasonable 
because they were not limited to protecting goodwill). 
 457. See, e.g., Drury Inn-Col. Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340, 343 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (finding that the 20% price term set was “unrelated to the conduct and 
action intended by the agreement.”);  Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 
1057, 1082–83 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that a non-compete agreement was 
reasonable where it limited only the trading of securities for a former employer’s 
customers). 
 458. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
market allocation restraints were not ancillary to the sale of a business due to the 
timing of the agreement);  Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) 
(requiring an ancillary restraint to be limited to the geographical bounds the 
larger agreement impacts);  Polygram Holding, Inc. v FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (2005) 
(limiting an ancillary restraint to the products at issue in the collaboration 
between firms). 
 459. See Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 830 (“Therefore, because the harm suffered by 
a consumer forced to pay inflated prices, and the harm inflicted on an excluded 
competitor and onetime cohort . . . both result from the anti-competitive effect of 
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timing of the agreement is essential;  where a firm has disbanded, 
it cannot argue that market allocation restraints were necessary 
to protect the firms during their dissolution.460 Further, in Palmer, 
the Court looked at geography, finding that an allocation of the 
U.S. market as a whole went beyond the firms’ statement that the 
restraint protected its interests regarding an acquisition in 
Georgia.461 In reality, the restraint was intended to lock the 
smaller company out of competition in other U.S. territories in 
exchange for the entire Georgia market.462 Finally, in Polygram 
Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C.,463 Judge Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit found 
that an agreement to limit advertising and discounting of The 
Three Tenors’ two previous recordings went beyond the joint 
venture’s purpose of distributing a recording of their 1998 
concert.464 The restraint instead simply destroyed the “competition 
of products that were not part of the joint undertaking.”465 
No-poach agreements may be subject to these same defects. 
The timing of a no-poach agreement should coincide with a 
collaboration and not after the collaborative effort has been 
completed.466 It cannot be unlimited in duration, geography, or 
other relevant bounds.467 Another common issue is that if a 
no-poach agreement applies broadly to all employees rather than 
                                                                                                     
the cartel agreement, they are both antitrust injuries.”). 
 460. See id. at 828–29 (“Polk teaches that courts must look to the time an 
agreement was adopted in assessing its potential for promoting enterprise and 
productivity—or, in this case, competition in the legal market.” (citing Polk Bros., 
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985))). 
 461. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 498 
U.S. 46 (1990) (“The written agreement has the effect of reducing price 
competition in Georgia and markets into which BRG might have otherwise 
entered absent the agreement.”). 
 462. See id. (“The agreement also has no redeeming procompetitive virtues.”). 
 463. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 464. See id. at 38 (“[M]ere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a 
defense under the antitrust laws.” (quoting Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 
(10th Cir. 1998))). 
 465. See id. (noting the restraint’s lack of pro-competitive effects). 
 466. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
market allocation restraints were not ancillary to the sale of a business due to the 
timing of the agreement). 
 467. See supra notes 453–465 and accompanying text (noting that the scope 
of the restraint must be appropriately limited). 
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certain joint venture employees, the restraint goes beyond the 
intent of the collaboration.468 
This question is central in franchise no-poaching cases and the 
franchise justification will likely hinge on whether the restraint is 
commensurate with and necessary to promote the larger 
integration.469  In the franchise context, the DOJ seems to more 
readily accept the franchise and franchisee relationship as a 
potential justification in most franchises.470 It states that 
“territorial allocation agreements are common in franchise and 
analogous relationships. They serve to [increase interbrand 
competition and] limit geographically ‘the number of sellers of a 
particular product competing for the business of a given group of 
buyers.’”471 It translates this justification to a no-poach restraint, 
stating that it “is a vertical allocation agreement ‘limiting the 
number of [employers] competing for . . . a given group of 
[employees] . . . .”472 
The DOJ relies on Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
but in this case, a television manufacturer used territory 
allocations to limit the sales of its products to the franchise 
locations that it approved.473 In a manner that is reminiscent of the 
Colgate discussion above, the restraint in Continental only 
concerned the vertical relationship between manufacturer and 
retailer.474 The Court narrowly recognized that “vertical 
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of 
                                                                                                     
 468. See Polygram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d 29 (limiting an ancillary restraint 
to the products at issue in the collaboration between firms). 
 469. See infra notes 470–472 and accompanying text (describing the DOJ’s 
position on a franchise system as a pro-competitive justification). 
 470.  See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (“Accordingly, because vertical 
territorial allocation agreements may have both procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects, courts evaluate their legality using the rule of reason’s 
balancing approach.”).  
 471. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (describing the rationale for the 
potential pro-competitive benefits of franchise no-poach restraints). 
 472. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (applying its theory in the no-poach 
context). 
 473. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1977) 
(describing the vertical restrictions). 
 474. See id. (describing the vertical restrictions). 
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his products.”475 By limiting the “number of sellers of a particular 
product competing for the business of a given group of buyers,” the 
manufacturer can ensure and more easily monitor the quality of 
its sellers, encourage increased investments in the sale of its 
products, and standardize services offered by its retailers.476 The 
vertical restriction was directly related to the distribution of its 
goods and necessary to achieve these effects.477  
This is not the case in franchise no-poach claims because the 
restraints impact the horizontal labor market and are too 
attenuated; as a result,  no-poach provisions do not similarly 
increase the efficiency of the franchisees within the brand.478 In 
fact, the opposite result occurs; by completely eliminating 
competition among franchisees for employees, the strongest 
franchisees cannot freely compete for the most talented 
employees.479 As a result, the franchisees have a less competitive 
work force and this has a negative impact on the downstream 
product or service market.480 A no-poach provision is not related to 
the goal of promoting investment, increased efficiency, or 
standardization of quality and services across the franchise.481 
This is because a franchise no-poach restraint uses a vertical 
relationship in one market to create a restriction in another;  it is 
not a purely vertical restraint that promotes the franchise or its 
downstream products.482  
Additionally, the Supreme Court took care in Continental TV 
to distinguish the restraint from that in United States v. Topco 
                                                                                                     
 475. Id. at 54–55. 
 476. See id. at 54–57 (noting the intrabrand benefits of vertical restraints 
between a manufacturer and retailer). 
 477. See id. at 38–39 (describing how its restraints were implemented 
according to its marketing strategy to phase out wholesalers in favor of 
specialized retailers). 
 478. See supra Part I.B (describing the anticompetitive effects of a no-poach 
agreement). 
 479. See supra Part I.B. 
 480. See supra Part I.B. 
 481. See supra notes 475–477 and accompanying text (describing intrabrand 
efficiencies of vertical restraints and how no-poach agreements disrupt 
competition in downstream product markets). 
 482. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 
795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (recognizing vertical elements but stating that the “effects are 
felt strictly at the horizontal level”). 
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Associates (and reaffirmed that previous decision in a footnote).483 
Topco was a cooperative association of independent regional 
supermarket chains;  its member supermarket chains wanted to 
create a brand of food products that it could distribute through 
associated supermarkets.484 However, “members [had] a veto of 
sorts over actual or potential competition in the territorial areas in 
which they are concerned.”485 Topco maintained that “it [needed] 
territorial divisions to compete with larger chains . . . [and] the 
association actually increases competition by enabling its 
members to compete successfully with larger regional and national 
chains.”486  
This justification was rejected.487 The Supreme Court found 
that Topco, a joint venture between horizontal competitors, 
engaged in per se illegal horizontal market allocations by 
restricting new members who operated too closely to the existing 
members.488 The purpose of the restraint was not necessary or 
related to the purpose of promoting the brand (the joint venture) 
but was a separate mechanism to shelter its members from 
competition.489 Although Topco can be distinguished from 
franchises in that the members of the association had very 
significant control over the venture, making the restraint more 
clearly horizontal, this question is still a factual one to be decided 
                                                                                                     
 483. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n. 27 (1977) 
(“United States v. Topco Associates . . . is not to the contrary, for it involved a 
horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors.”).  
 484. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 598-601 (1972) 
(describing the Topco Associates venture). 
 485. Id. at 602. 
 486. Id. at 605. 
 487. See id. at 606 (“The [district] court held that Topco's practices were 
procompetitive and, therefore, consistent with the purposes of the antitrust laws. 
But we conclude that the District Court used an improper analysis in reaching its 
result.”). 
 488. See id. at 609 (finding that the restraints were per se illegal, matching 
the types of restraints found in United States v. Sealy Inc.). 
 489. See id. (“Just as in this case, Sealy agreed with the licensees not to license 
other manufacturers or sellers to sell Sealy-brand products in a designated 
territory in exchange for the promise of the licensee who sold in that territory not 
to expand its sales beyond the area demarcated by Sealy.”). 
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in each case.490  
C.  The Justifications Must Actually Promote Competition 
Finally, the Sherman Act is limited to the protection of 
competition, reflecting society’s judgment that competition is the 
best method to ensure fair prices and high-quality products.491 As 
a result, justifications that go beyond this limited inquiry should 
be squarely rejected;  the antitrust laws do not support “a defense 
based on the assumption that competition itself is 
unreasonable.”492 These types of arguments generally possess the 
defect of focusing on speculative long-term effects, allowing firms 
in cartels to dominate stronger firms when natural market forces 
would have eliminated them, or acknowledging short-term losses 
exchanged for uncertain future benefits.493  
This seems to have been an undercurrent in Topco as well.494 
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that “it needs 
territorial divisions to compete with larger chains” and that the 
“anti-competitive effect [of] these practices . . . is far outweighed by 
the increased ability of Topco members to compete both with the 
national chains and other supermarkets operating in their 
respective territories.”495 If the Court had accepted this argument, 
it would have essentially taken the position that “competition itself 
is unreasonable.”496 If natural market forces result in the demise 
of smaller grocery chains in favor of larger chains, that is the will 
                                                                                                     
 490. See id. at 598 (“All of the stock in Topco is owned by the members . . . . 
The board of directors, which controls the operation of the association, is drawn 
from the members and is normally composed of high-ranking executive officers of 
member chains.”). 
 491. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) 
(rejecting the argument that a restraint is justified by the dangers of inferior 
engineering services). 
 492. See id. (recognizing that the argument that public policy dictates against 
competition is inconsistent with the Sherman Act). 
 493. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1906(b) (1998) (noting the 
defects of arguments that restriction of competition is necessary). 
 494. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 605 (1972) (describing 
the defendant’s justification). 
 495. Id.  
 496. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (rejecting the argument 
that a restraint is justified by the dangers of inferior engineering services). 
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of market and this result is not to be deterred by a conspiracy that 
artificially props up less efficient firms.497 Variations of this 
argument, such as the argument that certain restraints are 
necessary to withstand “ruinous competition” or to stabilize a 
market have also been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.498 
And arguments that restraints are necessary in a shortage of labor 
or to balance losses in one market meet similar results.499  
Finally, one argument that seems compelling at first is that a 
decrease in labor costs will lead to efficiencies by increasing a 
firm’s profitability and ability to create additional output for the 
consumers in other markets.500 This argument appeared to be 
                                                                                                     
 497. See id. at 689 (“[I]t cannot be argued that monopolistic arrangements in 
a particular industry having special characteristics should be allowed because 
such monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than 
competition.”). 
 498. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940) 
(“Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular 
price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not 
permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a 
defense to price-fixing conspiracies.”);  United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 
U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“The reasonable price fixed today may through economic 
and business changes become the unreasonable price of to-morrow. Once 
established, it may be maintained and unchanged because of the absence of 
competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed.”);  
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 331 (1897)  
To the question why competition should necessarily be conduct to such 
an extent as to result in this relentless and continued war, to eventuate 
only in the financial ruin of one or all of the companies indulging in it, 
the answer is made that, if competing railroad companies be left 
subject to the sway of free and unrestricted competition, the results 
above foreshadowed necessarily happen from the nature of the case. 
 499. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rejecting the idea that 
restrictions in televising games were necessary to protect a separate market for 
live game attendance);  Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 46 U.S. 643, 648 
(1980) (rejecting the premise that eliminating competition in credit terms would 
refocus price competition);  Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 423 
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that an association’s restraint on durum and wheat used 
to manufacture macaroni were not justified by shortages in these markets);  Hosp. 
Corp. of Am. V. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the argument that 
price coordination in one merging market would be offset by competition in other 
services). 
 500. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk and Broadcast Music). 
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vindicated in Polk and Broadcast Music.501 However, in these 
cases, the restraints actually increased competition, created new 
and tangible competitive offerings, and were necessary to facilitate 
greater collaboration between the firms.502 No-poach agreements 
do not fulfill these requirements; they instead appear to be 
attempts to increase revenue with speculative future benefits.503 
The mere profitability of a practice or the creation of cost savings 
does not qualify as a defense under the Sherman Act; after all, 
what would stop a firm from simply pocketing the profits?504 From 
a more technical standpoint, these profits should also not qualify 
as efficiencies since they do not benefit the relevant market for 
labor. 505  
Finally, antitrust law also does not tend to apply rule of reason 
analysis to the “costs of operating the competitive market itself.”506 
For example, information and other advertising costs are 
necessary to ensure ongoing competition between firms.507 The 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the necessity of correcting 
this information and other market information asymmetries.508 
The costs of competing for labor and the information asymmetries 
                                                                                                     
 501. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk, Broadcast Music, and Board of 
Regents). 
 502. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk and Broadcast Music). 
 503. See supra note 493 and accompanying text (describing how arguments 
that are unrelated to the goal of increasing competition often have the effect of 
asserting speculative future benefits). 
 504. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A 
restraint cannot be justified solely on the ground that it increases the profitability 
of the enterprise that introduces the new product . . . .”). 
 505. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 7.2 (stating that merger 
specific efficiencies are only recognized if they “would be sufficient to reverse the 
merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing 
price increases in that market”). 
 506. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (highlighting 
antitrust law’s goal of promoting competition rather than quelling these 
processes). 
 507. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (“[A] sine qua 
non of a well-functioning market is well informed participants and an agreement 
not to advertise threatens the right of consumers to become well informed.”). 
 508. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 764 (1999) (stating that 
advertising restrictions could restrain price although the probability of this harm 
was uncertain). 
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for wage information that no-poach agreements create fall 
squarely into this protected category.509 As a result, justifications 
for no-poach restraints—which have the effect of manipulating 
information costs in the labor market—are inherently suspect and 
have few plausible pro-competitive purposes.510 
V.  Conclusion 
Although the prosecution of no-poach restraints is relatively 
new and relevant jurisprudence is pending in this area, basic 
doctrinal principles of antitrust law support their condemnation. 
The nature of these restraints is inherently horizontal because 
they create restrictions between competitors in the labor 
market.511 A horizontal agreement can also be found via a hub-and- 
spoke theory in franchise cases.512 A horizontal agreement can also 
include companies which are vertically related in certain markets 
(still competitors in the same labor market).513 And when these 
employers enter into no-poach agreements, they form cartels.514 
They are motivated by a shared desire to depress the wages of 
employees and reduce employee turnover between them.515 This 
type of agreement is unlikely to occur in the absence of collusion 
since employers are usually motivated to compete against each 
other for the best employees.516 
                                                                                                     
 509. See No-Poach Approach, supra note 59 (“Robbing employees of labor 
market competition deprives them of job opportunities, information, and the 
ability to use competing offers to negotiate better terms of employment.”). 
 510. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“Dividing the market does not promote 
intrabrand competition for employees, it stifles interbrand competition.”).  
 511. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the antitrust agencies’ theory on no-
poach restraints). 
 512. See supra Part II.C. (arguing that the hub-and-spoke theory may be 
applicable to franchise no-poach restraints). 
 513. See supra notes 311–324 and accompanying text (describing how no-
poach agreements should be viewed as horizontal restraints). 
 514. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining how the agencies 
have described no-poach agreements as “hardcore cartel conduct”). 
 515. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that competition 
in the labor market provides employees with higher wages, among other things). 
 516. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (detailing the effects of no-
poach agreements). 
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Because no-poach agreements are—in form and effect—
horizontal market allocation agreements, the agencies’ position 
that they warrant per se condemnation is appropriate.517 In the 
alternative, no-poach agreements are well suited for quick-look 
analysis given their inherently anticompetitive nature and direct 
impact on price information in the labor market.518 There is a 
strong case for either per se or quick-look condemnation.519 And 
although the extended rule of reason is the standard of last resort 
for an antitrust plaintiff, it is possible to prevail under this 
standard as well, especially where the affected employees have 
specialized roles.520 
The antitrust plaintiff’s real challenge is meeting the initial 
burden.521 Once this has been accomplished, it is unlikely that a 
defendant can successfully raise a pro-competitive justification 
defense and receive a more lenient standard of review, such as the 
rule of reason.522 Only in limited circumstances are no-poach 
agreements truly ancillary to integrations between firms, 
necessary for the larger venture, and pro-competitive in their 
purpose.523 A close examination of no-poach agreements reflects 
their anticompetitive nature and dearth of efficiencies or 
justifications.524 Luckily, antitrust jurisprudence has evolved over 
                                                                                                     
 517. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (stating the antitrust 
agencies’ position on the legal treatment of no-poach agreements). 
 518. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the applicability of the quick-
look rule in no-poach cases given their direct impact on price and output). 
 519. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B (examining the applicability of the 
per se and quick-look rule in no-poach cases). 
 520. See discussion supra Part III.C (describing how a no-poach plaintiff 
should approach an extended rule of reason analysis). 
 521. See supra Parts IV.A–C (describing how no-poach restraints are likely to 
fail under the ancillary restraints doctrine). 
 522. See supra Parts IV.A–C (stating that once a no-poach plaintiff meets 
their burden under either the per se, quick-look, or extended rule of reason 
standard, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to assert a pro-competition 
justification). 
 523. See supra Parts IV.A–C (explaining that a pro-competitive justification 
offered must promote an integrative venture, serve a pro-competitive purpose, 
and be commensurate or necessary to achieve the intended purpose). 
 524. See supra Parts II.B (describing how no-poach restraints, on their face, 
are anticompetitive even to those with only a rudimentary understanding of 
economics), IV (noting no-poach restraints’ lack of redeeming qualities or pro-
competitive purposes). 
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the years to carve out several places to reject these types of 
restraints. 
